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INTRODUCTION
In the complex and chaotic world of mass torts, a class action that aggregates
the claims of aggrieved individuals against a common defendant would seem not
only a prudent solution, but possibly even a necessary one. The class device holds
out the promise of resolving issues "common" to all plaintiffs in a single trial,
preventing wasteful and repetitive litigation of similar issues, and the possibility of
inconsistent results. And collective adjudication allows plaintiffs to pool resources
against better-financed defendants. Despite these potential benefits and the
admiration of a host of commentators, however, the class action has thus far failed
to gain significant judicial acceptance as a fair and efficient mechanism for
resolving mass tort claims.' Indeed, the Supreme Court in recent years struck down
two wide-reaching mass tort class actions2 in such sweeping terms that many

* Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. I am grateful to the faculty
of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law who provided helpful comments on
an earlier version of this Article at a faculty workshop. My sincerest thanks, also, to Ed
Cooper, Chris Drahozal, Steve Gensler, Mary Kay Kane, Richard Marcus, Linda Mullenix,
Richard Nagareda, Ed Sherman, and Kent Syverud for their encouragement and insights.
Finally, I owe thanks to the University of Kansas for its generous research support. It should
be noted that while in private practice at Arnold & Porter, I represented Philip Morris in its
opposition to class certification in Castanov. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
1. See infra text accompanying notes 59-61.
2. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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3
observers predicted the death of the mass tort class action.
While on some level of generality the claims of mass tort plaintiffs present the
same issues regarding a defendant's misconduct, 4 recent class action jurisprudence
has emphasized that in most mass tort cases such commonalities are overshadowed
by the highly disparate character of plaintiffs' claims. 5 In the language of the
federal class action rule, the common factual and legal questions raised by mass
tort claims do not "predominate" over those questions unique to each individual. 6
In response to these concerns, a number of courts and scholars have
championed the notion of an "issue class action" alternative. 7 This alluring solution
to mass tort predominance problems contemplates a class action that only
encompasses issues common to the class, leaving individual class members to
adjudicate the pervasive individual aspects of their claims in separate fora. The
issue class action thus neatly evades the obstacle of predominance--common
issues obviously predominate
over individual issues in a class that contains no
8
individual issues at all.
In an earlier article, I argued that the current text of Rule 23 does not support
such an expansive interpretation, and does not permit certification of a class action
limited to common issues. 9 This Article analyzes the issue class action as a policy
matter, questioning its legitimacy as a form of representational litigation. Class
actions entail a significant displacement of fundamental individual autonomy rights
warranted only by necessity or inferred consent. 10 The consent justification for
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions is reflected in its predominance and superiority
requirements, which provide the criteria by which courts may infer consent to class
representation, as well as in its provision allowing class members to opt out of the
class action once certified." The issue class action undercuts each of these
protections against unwarranted representation: It seeks to delegate authority in
cases predominantly individual in nature, which undermines the inference of
consent derived from class cohesiveness. It exacerbates individual autonomy
concerns reflected in the superiority analysis, making it more difficult to infer class
consent to the delegation of litigant autonomy. And its limited, abstract nature

3. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77
OR. L. REv. 157, 158 (1998) (noting the prevailing view that recent appellate cases have
"pronounced the death knell for the mass tort class action"); S. Elizabeth Gibson, A
Response to Professor Resnick: Will This Vehicle Pass Inspection?, 148 U. PA. L. REv.

2095, 2097-98 (2000) (asserting that while recent Supreme Court cases "may not sound the
death knell for mass tort class action settlements, the decisions certainly increase the
difficulty of getting either type of class action certified by a district court and ultimately
approved on appeal").
4. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rover, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
5. See, e.g., Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2001); Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir.
1996); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d
Cir. 1995); Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1293.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 111-16.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 105-08.
9. See Laura J. Hines, Challengingthe Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709
(2003).
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67.
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complicates the meaningful exercise of opt-out rights by class members who might
wish to rebut the inference of consent.
Part I of this Article examines the failure of existing procedural mechanisms to
resolve the mass tort dilemma, which set the stage for the emergence of the issue
class action. Part II describes the issue class action, and explains why its
proponents see it as a tempting end run around many of the obstacles that thwart
mass tort class actions. This Part also summarizes the argument that a proper
interpretation of the current class action rule does not permit courts to certify
Part III considers various theories of
expansive issue class actions.'
representational litigation, concluding that the justification for discretionary (b)(3)
class actions lies in the inference of class members' consent. This Part next
evaluates the issue class action under each of the (b)(3) provisions that combine to
assure courts that consent may reasonably be inferred: predominance, superiority,
and the right to opt out of the class action. Close analysis reveals that the issue
class action undermines each of (b)(3)'s protections against unwarranted class
litigation, and therefore may unacceptably infringe upon individual autonomy
interests. Part III concludes with an assessment of the practical benefits and
problems raised by the issue class action. While the exclusion of individual issues
would undoubtedly make an issue class action more manageable, even the common
issues in such cases may prove unmanageable on a class basis, as they have in mass
tort class actions generally. And the limited scope of the issue class action,
specifically its exclusion of class claims for damages, raises a host of problems
unique to the issue class action and may inhibit its potential to accomplish
significant settlement goals.
I. THE MASS TORT DILEMMA

To understand the enormous pressure on courts to embrace the issue class
action as perhaps the only adjudicatory solution to complex mass torts today, one
first must consider the mass tort "dilemma" facing courts today. Mass torts, as the
name implies, involve allegations that a defendant's tortious conduct has harmed a
large number of people. Examples range from mass accidents such as plane
crashes, 13 hotel skywalk collapses, 14 and restaurant fires,' 5 to more dispersed mass
torts such as exposure to a defective product 16 or drug.' 7 Such cases became
increasingly common in the latter quarter of the last century,' 8 and new mass tort

12. See infra Part I.B.
13. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 737 F. Supp. 391 (E.D.
Mich. 1989).
14. See In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982).
15. See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982).
16. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys. Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (nationwide class
action asserting product defect claims against manufacturer of penile prostheses).
17. See, e.g., In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995) (nationwide
class action asserting product defect claims against manufacturer of Albuterol, a
bronchodilator prescription drug).
18. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:
PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 67 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The

Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1356 (1995).
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claims emerge every year.' 9 This phenomenon can be explained by reference to the
mass nature of our society today, with mass transit, nationwide product
distribution, and the development of new drugs and medical devices. 20 Or perhaps
it can be best understood sociologically as a reflection of late-twentieth-century
emphasis on individual entitlement and the rise of the entrepreneurial plaintiffs'
2
bar. '

Whatever the cause, however, the fact remains that whenever a new mass tort
arises, our judicial system confronts what often appears to be the daunting specter
of hundreds or thousands of individuals alleging similar harm from a defendant's
(or defendants') conduct. 22 The mass tort dilemma in part results from that specter
alone, the sheer number of potential mass tort claimants who might file lawsuits.
Often courts are importuned to certify a class action, for example, in order to
forestall an otherwise inevitable and unmanageable inundation of cases asserting
injury as a result of an alleged mass tort. This rhetoric of crisis can be traced to the
courts' disastrous experience with asbestos cases, 23 the best-studied and longestrunning mass tort with which our judicial system have been forced to contend. 24

19. See, e.g., In re Paxil Litig., 212 F.R.D. 539 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (alleging that the
manufacturer of the antidepressant drug Paxil failed adequately to warn of the severity of the
drug's side effects for patients attempting to discontinue use of the drug); In re Rezulin
Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (alleging that drug designed to treat
diabetes caused liver failure).
20. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An HistoricalAnalysis of the Binding Effect of
Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1849, 1948 (1998) ("Given modem commerce and
distribution of products, there will continue to be mass misfortunes that beget litigation, and
hence, 'mass torts."').
21. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass PersonalInjury
Litigation:A Socio-LegalAnalysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 1019-30 (1993).
22. Securities fraud and antitrust cases similarly present courts with allegations of large
numbers of individuals injured by a defendant's misconduct. Courts have struggled with
these cases as well, but the economic nature of the harm, the uniform federal law to be
applied, and the often mechanical task of determining damages in such cases have typically
been regarded as less troublesome than personal injury mass tort cases. But see William B.
Rubenstein, A TransactionalModel of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371 (2001) (challenging
the presumptions in favor of securities class actions and against mass tort class actions).
23. The judicial experience with asbestos claims was summed up in an influential report
on the subject:

[D]ockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow; long delays
are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated over and over;
transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery by nearly two to one;
exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and future
claimants may lose altogether.
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 3

(1991).
24. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 597 (1997); DEBORAH R.
HENSLER ET AL., RAND, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS ToxIc TORTS
(1985); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND, ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE U.S.: A NEW
LOOK AT AN OLD ISSUE (2001); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND, COSTS OF ASBESTOS

LITIGATION (1983); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION
COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES (1984); Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is

There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1819, 1830-68
(1992).
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Asbestos cases did indeed flood the courts in certain districts,25 and several of those
courts utilized novel procedural solutions for their overwhelming asbestos
caseloads. 26 But few incipient mass torts will ever rival the scope of the asbestos
cases.
First, not all mass tort claims prove meritorious. No deluge of cases will ever
occur if the allegedly tortious conduct cannot be established, due to a lack of
evidentiary support or failure to convince juries that defendant's conduct
constituted a tort. Second, not every mass tort results in an unmanageable caseload.
Asbestos aside, few mass torts will likely overwhelm courts to the point that
27
aggregate or representational litigation represents the only feasible alternative.
This is not to say mass torts do not pose a serious challenge to our judicial system,
may be overstated as a justification for the resort to
only that the rhetoric of crisis
28
novel, aggregate solutions.
Part of the mass tort dilemma, therefore, might be addressed by litigating the
first wave of individual cases alleging a mass tort, postponing resort to more
complex aggregation devices until the true extent of the mass tort can be
evaluated.29 Several commentators have urged courts to adopt just such a strategy,
waiting to embark on more adventuresome representational litigation until an
incipient mass tort "matures," in order to gain experience with varying litigation
strategies and better develop the factual record or scientific support for the
claims.30

25. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 18, at 23 ("[T]ens of thousands of asbestos lawsuits
were filed during the 1970s and 1980s, many of them in a few jurisdictions, where the
workers who had been exposed to asbestos had worked.").
26. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986); Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986).
27. See In re Paxil Litig., 212 F.R.D. 539, 551 (C.D. Cal. 2003). (The court rejected
plaintiffs' assertion that only a mass tort issue class action could prevent a judicial crisis:
"The Court is not persuaded that denial of class certification will result in thousands of
individual lawsuits bogging down the court system with thousands of cases being litigated
across the states. What is more likely to happen is that the most compelling cases will be
litigated first. The results of these cases undoubtedly will encourage the parties to dispose of
the remaining cases."). Id. But see Davis, supra note 3, at 205 (noting that Rule 23(b)(3)
does not require "that a judicial crisis the likes of asbestos litigation must be the paradigm
crisis by which all class actions are judged").
28. Cf Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation
Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichs Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 985-97 (2003) (questioning rampant
assumption regarding the "supposed litigation crisis" procedural reformists rely upon in
justifying a resort to quicker, streamlined procedures and alternative dispute resolution).
29. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 206 ("[W]here the claims are scientifically
immature in that the evidence, for example, of general causation is lacking or in its infancy,
the certification of a class may indeed be immature."); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 18, at
485.
30. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv.
659, 688-94 (1989); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LMGATION THIRD § 33.26 (1995).
While statutes of limitations may pose some problem with the wait and see methodology,
experience with a few mass torts suggests that allowing the medical science time to mature
could result in savings to litigants and courts. This would have been true in the Bendectin
cases, which alleged increased risk of birth defects from prenatal exposure to the drug
Bendectin. Epidemiological studies ultimately failed to establish a sufficient causal link
despite widespread belief in such a connection. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND
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Of course, this wait and see tactic risks adding undue delay in the resolution of
claims. 3 ' More importantly, such an approach reduces (at least initially) the pooling
of resources and bargaining power of collective litigation for plaintiffs. 32 Such
disadvantages, however, only rise to the level of a true dilemma in cases involving
negative value claims, where no individual litigation alternative exists because the
cost of litigation exceeds the amount of damages at stake for each individual. In
cases involving high value claims that merit individual adjudication, plaintiffs face
only ordinary litigation costs and the ordinary bargaining power of most tort
plaintiffs.
But courts and academics rightly point to another aspect of the mass tort
dilemma--duplicative litigation. Even when courts can effectively manage the
litigation of mass tort cases on an individual basis, there is bound to be some
degree of relitigation of issues. Because a defendant's conduct allegedly harmed a
large number of people, factual and legal questions surrounding the nature of that
conduct will likely be similar across cases. In addition, many dispersed mass tort
cases involve questions of general causation, the capacity of the allegedly defective
product to cause the injuries alleged. The risk of duplicative litigation abounds in
such circumstances-the same or similar discovery regarding defendant's conduct
will be conducted in each case, the same experts will likely testify, and the same or
similar issues will be adjudicated in each case.
Small wonder, then, that a number of courts have invoked innovative
procedural solutions to handle the influx of mass tort cases, including application
of non-mutual issue preclusion and certification of class actions. Most of these
efforts, however, have been struck down as improper by appellate courts. The
following sections briefly examine these procedural devices and consider the
reasons why both have encountered judicial resistance, if not hostility, in the arena
of mass tort cases. Tracing the failed history of issue preclusion and the
increasingly dour outlook for mass tort class actions helps explain why many have
advocated the issue class action as a possible answer to the mass tort dilemma.
More significantly, in order to fairly analyze the issue class action as a viable
alternative, one must clearly understand the policy and efficiency concerns that
have bedeviled judicial attempts to invoke preclusion and broader class action
certifications.
A. The Failureof the CollateralEstoppel Doctrine
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, represents one of the earliest responses
to concerns about duplicative litigation in mass tort cases. As set forth in the

BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION

19-22 (1995).

More recently, the breast implant litigation debacle-which left thousands of women
dissatisfied and Dow Coming in bankruptcy-might have been averted if the medical
science had time to develop: "Science has arrived at a substantial consensus, if not an
assurance of absolute safety." Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295, 339 (1996).
31. See David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons
From a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REv. 695, 710 (1989) (arguing that "the maturity
prerequisite generates years of redundant litigation, diverting enormously valuable party,
lawyer, expert, and judicial resources from other productive undertakings").
32. See, e.g., id. at 709-10; Rubenstein, supra note 22, at 433 (explaining that class
actions serve to "reduce disparities in bargaining power between plaintiffs and defendants").
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Restatement (Second) of Judgments, "When an issue of fact or law is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action
between the same parties." 33 The last requirement, referred to as the mutuality
doctrine, has been modified significantly by the advent of non-mutual preclusion.
While some states continue to adhere to the mutuality requirement, most states and
the federal courts have now adopted a discretionary, multi-factoral non-mutual
preclusion analysis that prevents relitigation of
34 an issue if a party has had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate in a previous case.
The Supreme Court articulated the federal test for such non-mutual collateral
estoppel in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.35 First, a plaintiff who easily could have
joined the prior action may not invoke preclusion. 36 This factor reflects the Court's
concern about the unfairness of allowing a new plaintiff to "wait and see" how the
first case turned out, taking advantage of an adverse defendant judgment but not
being bound herself by a judgment favorable to the defendant. Due process, the
party to the litigation to be bound by any
Court made clear, does not allow a new
37
earlier resolution of a disputed issue.
Second, the Court listed a number of factors to consider in determining the
"fairness" of allowing preclusion. The presence of inconsistent prior judgments, for
example, would render preclusion on an adverse judgment unfair. 38 Similarly, if the
prior action involved smaller stakes relative to the subsequent action, creating less
incentive for the defendant to litigate fully, the Court suggested preclusion would
be unfair.39 Courts must also take into account procedural opportunities not
available in the first action.4°
Shortly after Parklane's abandonment of the mutuality requirement, the
Eastern District of Texas attempted to utilize non-mutual collateral estoppel in
several cases involving asbestos claimants. 41 The Fifth Circuit, however, in Hardy
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., struck down those attempts on several grounds that
continue to dog application of the doctrine in mass tort cases. 42 First, the lower
court had invoked issue preclusion against defendants who had not been parties to
the earlier action on which preclusion had been based.43 In mass torts involving

33.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 27 (1982).

34. Id. § 29.
35. 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (allowing shareholder to assert non-mutual preclusion on issue
of corporation's misleading proxy statements in violation of securities based on prior SEC
litigation).
36. Id. at 331.
37. Id. at 327 & n.7 (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 329 (1971)).
38. Id. at 330.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 331.
41. See, e.g., Flatt v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980);
Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
42. 681 F.2d 334, 344-46 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Thomas E. Willging, Mass Tort
Problems and Proposals:A Report to the Mass Torts Working Group, 187 F.R.D. 328, 427
(1999) ("Issue preclusion has been attempted in asbestos litigation with little or no
success.").

43. Hardy, 681 F.2d at 338-39. Courts also have rejected attempts by defendants to
utilize collateral estoppel against plaintiffs who have not yet had an opportunity to litigate
their claims. See, e.g., Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190 (1987) (rejecting
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large numbers of defendants, such as asbestos cases, the court emphasized that
similarity of interests does not suffice to permit preclusion."
Three other problems addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Hardy continue to
frustrate the utility of the collateral estoppel doctrine to preclude litigation of issues
in mass torts cases. First, the court found ambiguity as to the issue actually decided
in the earlier action on which the plaintiff sought to preclude litigation. 45 The
earlier case established that the defendants had not adequately warned the plaintiff
of the dangers of asbestos, but beyond that the court found the earlier verdict
ambiguous: "it is impossible to determine what the [earlier] jury decided about
when a duty to warn attached. 46 Moreover, the earlier case involved circumstances
specific to the previous plaintiff that were not the same in the later cases, including
different employment, exposure, products, and knowledge of the risks of
asbestos.47 While special interrogatory verdicts might be used that make more clear
the exact grounds on which a jury bases its verdict, the problem of isolating the
same issue in complex factual and legal circumstances remains a serious
impediment to the use of collateral estoppel in mass tort cases."
Second, the court in Hardy found preclusion improper because of the existence
of prior inconsistent verdicts on the issue of the defendants' duty to warn. 4 9 Again,
this factor does not bode well for preclusion in any economically viable mass tort
case. Inconsistent verdicts are often the norm in such cases, and early defendant
verdicts are far more common than plaintiff verdicts.5 0
Finally, the Fifth Circuit rejected the application of collateral estoppel on the
ground that the earlier case had involved relatively smaller stakes and therefore
inadequate incentives for the defendants to litigate as vigorously as they would
have had they understood the5 1case's preclusive impact on future cases involving
millions of dollars of liability.

defendant's argument that plaintiff should be precluded from litigating issue of causal link
between in utero exposure to Bendectin and birth defects based on verdict in Multi-District
Litigation consolidated trial).
44. Hardy, 681 F.2d at 339-40. But see Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court"
Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion,67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 193 (1992).
45. Hardy, 681 F.2d at 344-46.
46. Id. at 344 (emphasis in original).
47. Cf Roger H. Trangsrud, JoinderAlternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 779, 813 (1985) ("In a mass product defect case, the plaintiff seeking estoppel must
show an identity in both cases of the product used, the defect claimed, and the circumstances
surrounding its purchase and use by the plaintiff.").
48. See, e.g., Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2000)
(reversing district court's application of non-mutual collateral estoppel in negligence action
against the uranium mill defendant because of failure to establish that the issue to be
precluded was the same as that found by the jury in the previous case); Trangsrud, supra
note 47, at 813-14 (opining that the need to establish identity of issue in mass tort cases may
be an impossible burden for plaintiffs to satisfy, particularly in light of varying state laws).
49. Hardy, 681 F.2d at 345-46.
50. See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV.

1821, 1842 (1995) ("The cyclical theory of mass tort litigation contemplates an initial stage
in the litigation during which there are inherent advantages for the defendant.... During this
initial stage of the cycle, the defendant tends to win the cases it chooses to try and is often
able to settle lawsuits quietly with little impact on other cases.").
51. Hardy, 681 F.2d at 346-47.
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Some scholars, frustrated by the kind of judicial resistance to collateral
estoppel illustrated by Hardy, have urged that preclusive force should be given to52
the first adjudication of an issue in all subsequent cases, whatever the outcome.
To permit preclusion on the basis of a single, initial verdict in all subsequent cases,
however, would place enormous pressure on resolution of that first case. Such
pressure has several disadvantages that can outweigh the efficiency and finality
advantages. First, defendants would likely devote excessive resources to the first of
any potentially mass tort claim. This could lead to wasteful expenditures on the part
of the defendant, possibly prohibitively expensive litigation for the plaintiff, and
undue judicial and managerial costs. More importantly, it would be unfair to permit
preclusion based on a single verdict in mass tort cases where the evidence would
have supported a judgment for either party. As one critic has explained, "In such
circumstances there is no certainty that the initial verdict was
53 correct and imposing
the facts found in the first action on all later cases is unfair."
The proposals for expansion of non-mutual collateral estoppel have not gained
much momentum with courts, and the doctrine has thus far proven to be of little
utility in mass tort cases. 54 Instead, beginning in the 1980s, courts stepped up
efforts to utilize the class action device to achieve mass preclusion of issues that
individual application of the collateral estoppel doctrine could not accomplish. The
next section explores the obstacles and appellate resistance these mass tort class
actions have faced.
B. The Failureof the Mass Tort Class Action
The drafters of the 1966 amendment to Rule 23, the current federal class action
rule, clearly never contemplated that the rule would play a significant role in the
nascent world of mass torts. Indeed, Rule 23's Advisory Committee Note spells out
the framers' skepticism towards, if not their outright disapproval of, the utilization

52. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff

Autonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 809,
815-22 (1989). But see Jack Ratliff, Offensive CollateralEstoppel and the Option Effect, 67
TEx. L. REV. 63, 79 (1988); 18A

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &

§ 4449 (2d ed. 2002) (arguing against such an "erosion. Our deeprooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court draws from clear
experience with the general fallibility of litigation and with the specific distortions of
judgment that arise from the very identity of the parties."); Elinor P. Schroeder, Relitigation
PROCEDURE JURISDICTION

of Common Issues: The Failure of Nonparty Preclusion and an Alternative Proposal, 67

IOWA L. REV. 917, 980 (1982) (rejecting proposals to preclude nonparties after the first
litigation of a common issue).
53. Transgrud, supra note 47, at 813.
54. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 213,
222 (1991) ("[T]he federal appellate courts have effectively eliminated issue preclusion as a
means of preventing the relitigation of duplicative claims, except in the narrowest of
circumstances. These doctrines have frustrated the ability of federal courts to deal with mass
tort cases in an aggregative fashion, thus requiring the repetitive adjudication of thousands of
similar claims."); Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive CollateralEstoppel to Fulfill
Its Promise:An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141, 224
(1984) ("[C]ollateral estoppel has little potential to make a significant contribution in
resolving the judicial administration difficulties engendered by asbestos litigation."); see
generally LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION 404-38 (1996) (collecting mass tort

cases considering the application of issue preclusion).
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of the class action to resolve such cases: "A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to
numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the
likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and
defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different
ways. 55
Despite this warning, however, courts soon after the Rule 23 amendment
began resorting to the class action rule to help manage the growing number of mass
tort cases. The initial inroads took place in cases involving mass disasters, single
event torts like fires or accidents.5 Courts through the early 1980s continued to
resist, however, broadening this development by certifying class actions to handle
more dispersed mass torts. 57 But in the mid-1980s, particularly in asbestos cases,
courts began5 8to certify such actions more readily, with certifications peaking in the
early 1990s.

The pendulum swung back, however, as a series of appellate courts in the late
1990s struck down several far-reaching class actions involving nationwide
exposure to defective products produced over time.5 9 Indeed, the Supreme Court
twice entered the mass tort class action fray during this era, and twice struck down
sweeping asbestos class action settlements. 6° These decisions raise a great deal of
doubt as to the viability of any mass tort class action. 6 To determine whether the

55. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
56. See, e.g., Am. Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155

(N.D. Ill.
1969) (exhibition hall fire); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558
(S.D. Fla. 1973) (cruise ship food poisoning outbreak); see generally MULLENIX, MASS TORT
supra note 54, at 140-91 (describing initial mass tort class action "inroads and
successes").
57. See, e.g., Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Mertens v.
Abbott Labs., 99 F.R.D. 38, 42 (D.N.H. 1983) (describing benefits of certifying class
alleging injury from mothers' exposure to DES to be "at best obscure, and the gain difficult
to perceive"); Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 179 (1969) ("There has
been no sign to date that class actions are being attempted in mass tort cases.").
58. See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 18, at 22-27.
59. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (tires);
Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2001) (stucco siding); Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (cigarettes); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d
1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (penile prostheses); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (trucks); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51
F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (blood products); see also HENSLER ET AL., supra note 18, at 3137; Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother
Sailingfor Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (2000) ("Since 1995,
federal courts have articulated an increasingly conservative class action jurisprudence that
LITIGATION,

has directed federal courts to stringently scrutinize proposed litigation and settlement
classes.").
60. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
61. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 372-74 (2000)
(describing Amchem and Ortiz as having "essentially frozen the development of the class

action," and warning against "an expansive reading" of those cases that "threatens the
viability of the class action across a broad range of litigation contexts"); Davis, supra note 3,
at 157. But see Mullenix, supra note 59, at 1732-34 (noting that post-Amchem, "federal
courts have equally granted and denied class certifications (both in the litigation and
settlement contexts) based on application of Amchem principles") (footnotes omitted).
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issue class action can escape the fate of these class actions or instead suffers from
many of the same infirmities, this Part concludes with a brief analysis of Rule 23
and why many appellate courts remain leery of its application in mass tort cases.
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
Rule 23 requires that every class action satisfy the prerequisites of subdivision
(a)-numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy-and fit into one of the
subdivision (b) categories of class actions. The two types of class actions
authorized by subdivision (b)(1) reflect the class action equivalents of necessary
party joinder.62 The first requires that inconsistent adjudications would create
"incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class." 63 The second
requires certification where individual adjudications that would be practically
dispositive of the interests of other members of the class or would "impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests. '" 64 Rule 23(b)(2) 6permits mandatory
class actions for classes seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.
Thus far, neither (b)(1) nor (b)(2) has proven much help in addressing mass
torts. The Supreme Court struck down an asbestos claimant (b)(1)(B) limited fund
class certification in Ortiz v. FibreboardCoyo., in sweeping language that bodes ill
for future (b)(1)(B) mass tort class actions. And attempts to utilize (b)(1)(A) and
(b)(2) have met consistent resistance.67
To the extent that courts have certified mass tort class actions at all, Rule
23(b)(3) has been the subdivision of choice. Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes certification
of a class action for damages where litigation of claims on a class basis can achieve
efficiencies without sacrificing fairness or other important values. 68 Class actions
under (b)(3) are discretionary on the part of courts, and class members must be
served notice of the action informing them of the nature of the action and their right
to opt out of the action. 69 In addition to the (a) prerequisites, the (b)(3) rule requires
a court to find that issues common to the class "predominate" over individual
issues and that the class device presents the "superior" method of adjudicating the
dispute. Both of these requirements have proven problematic for the certification of
mass tort class actions. A brief discussion of the predominance and superiority
factors helps to illuminate why mass torts have presented such challenges for class
certification under (b)(3).

62. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
63. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(b)(l)(A).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
66. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815 (1999). But see In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (certifying (b)(1)(B) limited fund class action to resolve class punitive
damages claims).
67. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986) (certifying class
action under (b)(3) but rejecting plaintiff attempts to certify asbestos property damage claims
under (b)(1) or (b)(2)).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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2. Rule 23(b)(3): Predominance
While the predominance test cannot be reduced to any quantitative formula,
the rule requires that the common questions of law or fact predominate over
questions that must be decided on an individual-by-individual basis. The very
nature of most mass torts, particularly those involving personal injuries, inevitably
involves a host of complex individual issues: the degree and nature of exposure to
an allegedly harmful product, specific causation of the plaintiffs injury by that
exposure, the existence and extent of injury, possible affirmative defenses such as
contributory negligence or assumption of risk, and quantum of damages.7 °
Rejecting certification of an asbestos settlement class action in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, Inc., the Supreme Court emphasized the complicated morass of
individual issues that thwarted any finding of predominance:
"Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over
different periods. Some class members suffer no physical injury or have
only asymptomatic pleural changes, while others suffer from lung
cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from mesothelioma .... Each has a
different history of
cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the
71
causation inquiry."
Given these disparities among class members, the Court concluded, no common
issues such as "the health consequences of asbestos" could possibly satisfy (b)(3)
predominance.72
In the last decade, appellate courts have rejected most mass tort class actions
on predominance grounds, citing the highly disparate nature of the factual issues
raised by class members' claims. 73 As one court explained, "the economies of scale
achieved by class treatment are more than offset by
74 the individualization of
numerous issues relevant only to a particular plaintiff.,
In addition to the large number of factual variations among class plaintiffs'
claims, courts have found state law variations to pose a seemingly insurmountable
obstacle to finding predominance in mass tort class actions. In Amchem, for
example, the Supreme Court concluded that the need to apply fifty state laws
hugely compounded the factual disparities among class members' claims.75 Indeed,

70. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule

23, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 858, 895 (1995) (noting that predominance "present[s] peculiarly
vexing problems in the mass tort context").
71. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 624 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996)).
72. Id.
73. See supra note 59.
74. In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996); see also In re
Rezulin Prod. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[W]hile there no doubt are
common questions concerning the characteristics of Rezulin and the manner in which the
FDA approval was obtained, individual questions, particularly but not limited to causation
and reliance, overwhelm these common issues.").
75. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624.
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most appellate courts have cited varying state law standards in concluding
that
76
proposed mass tort class actions fail the (b)(3) predominance requirement.
3. Rule 23(b)(3): Superiority
Rule 23(b)(3) requires courts to determine that the class action device
represents the superior method of adjudicating class members' claims, inviting
examination of other adjudicatory means. The subdivision sets forth several
grounds on which to consider superiority that focus on individual adjudication as
the primary alternative to the class action. The rule directs courts to consider the
interest of class members in controlling the litigation on an individual basis, the
extent of litigation already underway, the desirability of concentrating the action in
a particular forum, and whether the proposed class action will be manageable.77
The first listed factor reminds courts that a (b)(3) class action is a
discretionary, not a necessary aggregation device as in (b)(1) and (b)(2), and that an
individual's autonomy in controlling her own litigation choices must be respected.
Similarly, the extent of litigation inquiry suggests that if individuals have already
engaged in litigation, such lawsuits are feasible and may be regarded as preferable
to the (b)(3) class action. In other words, (b)(3)'s first two superiority factors
reflect concern about interfering with individual litigation autonomy, and suggest
that the framers intended the rule to apply in cases where the stakes are sufficiently
low that individual litigation is not feasible and class members have small stakes in
the outcome.'
Indeed, courts have expressly considered whether the class claims amount to a
"negative value claim" where the costs of litigation exceed the expected benefit to
individual members. Such a factor weighs in favor of class adjudication, while the
converse, high stakes claims that warrant individual litigation, weighs against a
finding that a class action is the superior option. The Supreme Court in Amchem
recognized this concern, cautioning against class actions
where "individual stakes
79
are high and disparities among class members great."
Courts also have considered the relative maturity of class claims in
determining superiority, a factor relevant both to the extent of litigation already
commenced and the desirability of concentrating class claims. The Seventh
Circuit's opinion in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer represents an early and influential
example of the significance of an "immature" tort in the superiority analysis.80 In
Rhone-Poulenc, the court emphasized that the theories of liability had only been

76. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc.. 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.
2001); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996) ("We find it
difficult to fathom how common issues could predominate in this case when variations in
state law are thoroughly considered."); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th
Cir. 1995).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
78. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 ("While the text of Rule 23(b)(3) does not exclude from
certification cases in which individual damages run high, the Advisory Committee had
dominantly in mind vindication of 'the rights of groups of people who individually would be
without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all."') (quoting Benjamin
Kaplan, A PrefatoryNote, 10 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.497, 497 (1969)).
79. Id. at 625; see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996);
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
80. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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litigated a handful of times, and that the novel negligence theories would require
the federal court, faithful to its Erie R.R. v. Tompkins8 1 obligation, to make guesses
as to how each of fifty states would approach the new tort theory. While courts
must sometimes accept such an obligation, the Seventh Circuit's superiority
analysis led it to conclude that such a class action would not8 3be the superior method
of adjudication where individual lawsuits could be brought.
Building on this superiority analysis, the Fifth Circuit in Castano v. American
Tobacco Co. similarly cited immaturity concerns in decertifying a class action of
84
cigarette smokers seeking compensation for their addiction to cigarettes. The
Fifth Circuit asserted:
[A] mass tort cannot be properly certified without a prior track record of
trials from which the district court can draw the information necessary
to make the predominance and superiority analysis required by rule 23.
This is because certification of an immature tort results in a higher than
normal risk 85
that the class action may not be superior to individual
adjudication.

The final superiority factor explicitly set forth in Rule 23(b)(3), manageability,
has come to encompass a host of concerns. Obviously, the court must consider the
factual and legal variations among class members' claims to determine (in addition
to whether such variations undermine predominance) whether those disparities will
prove unmanageable in a litigation context.86 Even courts certifying mass tort class
actions have questioned whether such complex issues can meaningfully be
managed by a court, but have placed their hopes in various judicial management
tools such as special masters, magistrates, and subclassing.87 Other courts have
pointed to manageability concerns to buttress their rejection of a proposed class
riddled with complex issues not easily amenable to classwide proof. 88 Part of the

81. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
82. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300.
83. Id. at 1304; see also Castano, 84 F.3d at 734.
84. 84 F.3d at 747.
85. Id.; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LMGATION, supra note 30, §33.26 ("Fairness
may demand that mass torts with few prior verdicts or judgments be litigated first in smaller
units . . .until general causation, typical injuries, and levels of damages are established.
Thus, 'mature' torts like asbestos or Dalkon Shield may call for procedures that are not
appropriate for incipient mass tort cases."); Thomas E. Willging, Beyond Maturity: Mass
Tort Case Management in the Manual for Complex Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2225
(2000); McGovern, supra note 30.
86. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v, Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 64 (1986)
(noting that nationwide class actions "present an even greater problem because of the sheer

burden of organizing and following fifty or more different bodies of complex substantive
principles").
87. See, e.g., Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 190 (4th Cir.
1993).
88. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the class claims at issue were not manageable due to factual variations
compounded by need to apply differing state laws); Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 253
F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing manageability "complexities" that "weigh heavily
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manageability prong requires acknowledgment of the high transaction costs
associated with8 9(b)(3) class actions, particularly the cost of providing notice to the
class members.
Finally, courts have looked to whether the inevitable severance of issues tried
in a class action truly promotes efficiency while preserving fairness. Some courts
have suggested that those bifurcation concerns might amount to a violation of
Seventh Amendment jury trial rights. 9° For example, where class claims permit the
assertion of individualized defenses such as comparative or contributory
negligence, it would be very difficult for a new jury in the individual phase of
litigation to weigh and allocate fault among parties when the class jury has already
determined the issue of the defendant's negligence. 9' At the very least, the second
jury would have to rehear some of the evidence to assess the relative weight of the
defendant's negligence as against that of the individual plaintiffs. That need to
reconsider evidence of the defendant's conduct may violate the Seventh
Amendment's Reexamination Clause, and at best undermines the efficiencies
gained by determining the issue on a class basis.92
C. Conclusion
Neither nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel nor the (b)(3) class action has
proved reliably successful in resolving the mass tort dilemma. The shortcomings of
these procedural devices, as demonstrated above, are not wholly unrelated. Both
suffer from the highly complex and individualized nature of mass tort claims
themselves, as well as the high stakes involved in such claims. These
characteristics of mass tort claims make it quite difficult to find the requisite
identity of issue (or predominance of common issues) and fairness (or superiority)
of trying an issue once and precluding further litigation. The issue class action,
however, has been promoted as a procedural alternative that can achieve mass issue
preclusion where collateral estoppel and the (b)(3) class action have failed. The
next Part will examine the issue class action and the debate surrounding its
meaning, while the remainder of the Article will consider whether the issue class
action truly represents an opportunity to avoid the problems that have thwarted
collateral estoppel and the (b)(3) class action from resolving the mass tort dilemma.

against class certification," including varying facts and the need to apply differing state
laws).
89. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing the
cost of providing "notice to millions of class members" as part of the "extensive
manageability problems" with the lower court's class certification).
90. See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 751-52; In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1302-04 (7th Cir. 1975).
91. See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 751-52; Rhone-Poulenc,51 F.3d at 1302-04.
92. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1303. But see Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 200 F.R.D.
21, 28-49 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 463 (D. Wyo. 1995);
Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause,
83 IowA L. REv. 499, 542 (1998) (arguing that "the separate trial of overlapping issues does
not necessarily violate the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause," and should not
obscure the benefits of an issue class action).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:567

II. THE ISSUE CLASS ACTION "ALTERNATIVE"
Frustration with the steady stream of mass tort cases in the late 1980s and
1990s, particularly asbestos, led many courts into "a period of desperate
improvisation. 9 3 This era represented the heyday of mass tort class actions and,
not coincidentally, witnessed the emergence of the issue class action. As courts
struggled to find solutions to the mass tort dilemma, the Advisory Committee's
cautionary advice against mass tort class actions became increasingly muted and
ineffectual. While acknowledging the highly complex individual issues raised by
mass tort claims, some courts determined that representative litigation of the
common issues in such cases would still constitute an improvement over individual
adjudication.94 Casting about in search of support for these innovative mass tort
class actions, such courts seized upon the language of Rule 23(c)(4), which states
that "[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues .... 95 and the provisions of this rule shall then be

construed and applied accordingly."
Today, class action plaintiffs increasingly pursue the strategy of seeking class
certification under either Rule 23(b)(3) or (c)(4)(A), assuming that the latter
9
provision authorizes an alternative form of class action: the issue class action. 6
This Part considers the development of the issue class action "alternative" and
analyzes the proper interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(A).

93. Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An InstitutionalEvolutionist Perspective,80 CORNELL

L. REV. 941, 948 (1995). In addition to the rise of the issue class action, courts during this
time experimented with other novel approaches to achieving aggregate solutions in mass tort
cases. The "settlement class action" experiment received the greatest amount of attention.
See e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (rejecting argument that
Rule 23 empowered courts to certify "settlement class actions" that could not otherwise
satisfy the rule's (a) and (b) requirements); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). As a result of the spotlight
provided by the Supreme Court and a host of commentators, Rule 23 itself has been
amended to specifically address settlement class actions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (g)-(h)
(amended 2003). The most revolutionary (but ultimately failed) experiment from this era
was a district court's effort to litigate individual issues such as causation, injury, and
damages on an aggregate basis using statistical sampling and extrapolation. See Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (reversing lower court's sampling and
extrapolation plan for asbestos class action); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 337, 344-45.
94. As one court explained: "Even if the action thereafter 'degenerates' into a series of
individual damage suits, the result [of class findings on liability issues] nevertheless works
an improvement over the situation in which the same separate suits require adjudication on
liability using the same evidence over and over again." In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d
996, 1008 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177,
185 (4th Cir. 1993); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
96. See, e.g., Benner v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 214 F.R.D. 157, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(rejecting plaintiffs' "attempt to avoid the shortfalls of previous product liability class
actions by moving only for [(c)(4)(A) issue class] certification on two issues they argue are
common to the class").
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A. The Rise of the Issue Class Action

While Rule (c)(4)(A) 97 dates back to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, this
provision of the class action rule languished in relative obscurity until it began to
prove useful to courts certifying mass tort class actions.98 At first, such courts
simply relied on (c)(4)(A) to take the sting out of the Advisory Committee's
warning against mass tort class certification." The provision was not initially
regarded as providing stand-alone authority to certify a class action that would not
otherwise comply with Rule 23(b)(3).'0 Rather, its role in the class action rule
served to underscore judicial discretion to approve (b)(3) class actions despite the
need to separately adjudicate individual issues raised by class claims.10' The Third
Circuit aptly articulated this vision of (c)(4)(A) as augmenting courts' expansive
interpretation of (b)(3): "Reassessment of the utility of the class action in the mass
tort area has come about, no doubt, because
' 10 2 courts have realized that such action
need not resolve all issues in the litigation."
But once (c)(4)(A) emerged from the class action shadows in the 1980s and
early 1990s, its broad language became somewhat of a siren's song to courts and
commentators eager to find solutions to the mass tort dilemma. In particular, the
provision came to be seen as authorizing a new breed of class action, the "issue
class action." Its chief allure: the exclusion of individual issues from the class
action.
In the quest for issue preclusion in mass tort cases, where collateral estoppel
had failed and (b)(3) class actions too often ran afoul of the predominance
requirement, issue class actions appeared to offer the best of both procedures.
Unlike collateral estoppel, the existence of prior inconsistent judgments could not
prevent a court from certifying an issue class action. And more importantly, an
issue class action could bind both plaintiffs and defendants to the outcome of a

97. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
98. See, e.g., Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf Is Predominantand Superior to None: Class
Certification of ParticularIssues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REv. 249, 274-75
(explaining that courts in the 1980s "brought Rule 23(c)(4)(A) into the mainstream" in
asbestos cases, although before that time "mass tort cases--the most prominent of class
actions-were rarely certified").
99. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1008 (noting that despite Advisory
Committee warning to the contrary, "there is growing acceptance of the notion that some
mass accident situations may be good candidates for class action treatment").
100. See e.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. United States District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 692
(9th Cir. 1977) (citing (c)(4)(A) along with Rule 42(b) to approve the lower court's class
action bifurcation plan); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100, 113 (E.D. Va. 1980)
(explaining that Rule 23(c)(4)(A) may be employed to "bifurcat[e] the class actions here
certified between liability issues and damage issues"); Hines, supra note 9, at 729-36
(detailing history of the judicial interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(A)).
101. See, e.g., McQuilken v. A&R Dev. Corp., 576 F. Supp. 1023, 1028 (E.D. Pa.
1983); In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433, 442 n.17 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (explaining
that Rule 23(c)(4)(A) permits class actions "even when some matters will have to be treated
on an individual basis," and was intended to realize class action economies "in cases with a
mixture of common and uncommon issues that are separable").
102. Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1008.
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single adjudication of a particular issue, rather
than the one-way preclusion against
10 3
defendants offered by collateral estoppel.
Compared to a (b)(3) class action, the issue class action appeared even more
tempting, holding out the promise of binding issue preclusion on all issues common
to class members without being bogged down by any of the complex,
individualized issues raised by class claims (such as causation, injury, affirmative
defenses, and damages). Following the resolution of the issue class action, class
members would be expected to file separate lawsuits in other 1fora
in order to
4
litigate all the individual issues left unresolved by the class action. 0
This exclusion of noncommon issues from the issue class action, moreover,
convinced issue class action proponents that (c)(4)(A) fundamentally alters the
05
(b)(3) predominance inquiry, essentially eliminating that requirement altogether. 1
If an issue class action consists only of common issues, then by definition those
common issues must predominate over individual issues because the action
contains no individual issues at all. 106 The implication of this interpretation for
mass tort class actions is significant, especially in light of the recent series of
07
appellate decisions rejecting classes for failure to satisfy the predominance test. 1
If the predominance test does not apply to issue class actions, or applies in a less
stringent manner,
a seemingly insurmountable objection to mass tort class actions
10 8
melts away.
One early judicial proponent of this view of (c)(4)(A) dismissed as "illogical"
the argument that, even in an issue class action, (b)(3) requires that all issues raised
by class claims be considered in conducting the predominance inquiry, and that
common issues outweigh the individual issues in the case as a whole. 10 9 Instead,
the court explained, analysis of the predominance requirement in issue class actions

103. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1982);
supra note 43 and accompanying text; see generally Ratliff, supra note 52.
104. See Romberg, supranote 98, at 266.
105. See, e.g., Romberg, supra note 98, at 263 (claiming that issue class actions can
"fundamentally revamp the nature of class actions").
106. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION THIRD, supra note 30, § 30.17
(urging courts to consider only "the certified issues" when conducting the (b)(3)
predominance analysis for issue class actions); 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.23 (4th ed. 2002) (asserting that (c)(4)(A) issue class
actions "automatically satisfy[] the predominance test under Rule 23(b)(3)"); Romberg,
supra note 98, at 295-96 (arguing that in issue class actions, "common issues predominate
by definition" because "the scope of the entire controversy that will be resolved in the suit is
the common issues") (emphasis in original).
107. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002); Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255
F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2001); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Ci. 1996); In re
Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
108. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, A Consent-BasedApproach to Class Action Settlement:
Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1184 (1998)
(criticizing the Court in Amchem for failing to recognize that issue class actions "confer[]
advantages of economy, while preserving fairness interests, in nearly any case in which a
large number of plaintiffs sue a common defendant for exposure to the same product").
109. In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 727 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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"is quite different than in the usual application of Rule 23(b)."' 10 Several other
courts similarly adopted an expansive view of the issue class action, emphasizing
that (c)(4)(A) could play an important role in mass tort cases involving complex
individual issues."'
In Valentino v. Carter-Wallace,Inc., the Ninth Circuit became one of the few

appellate courts to address Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and its interplay with the (b)(3)
predominance requirement. 112 Siding with issue class action advocates, the
Valentino court made clear that lower courts should consider the issue class action
alternative authorized by (c)(4)(A): "Even if the common issues do not
predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of the entire
action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to
isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment
of these particular issues.""13 As in the rule itself, however, the court provided little
guidance as to when such an issue class action would be "appropriate."
The majority of commentators have also looked favorably on the issue class
action alternative, often embracing it as one of the best solutions to the mass tort
dilemma." 4 As explained by a leading treatise on class actions: Thus, "when
common questions do not predominate when compared to all questions that must
be adjudicated to dispose of a suit, Rule 23(c)(4) asks whether a suit limited to the
unitary adjudication of a particular common issue" can be certified. Similarly, the
Federal Judicial Center's Manual for Complex Litigation urges consideration of the
issue class action in cases that otherwise "may either not qualify under the rule or
be unmanageable as a class action."'1 5 One recent article devoted to the subject of
issue class actions trumpeted (c)(4)(A) as playing a heroic role in offering courts

110. Id.; see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[C]ourts
should take full advantage of the provision in subsection (c)(4) permitting class treatment of
separate issues in the case and, if such separate issues predominate sufficiently (i.e., is [sic]
the central issue), to certify the entire controversy ....
").

111. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84
F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995);
Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Il. 1994), rev'd on writ of
mandamus sub nom., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). But see
Caruso v. Celsius Insulation Resources, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 530, 538 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (rejecting
a request for a "reevaluation" of plaintiffs' formaldehyde exposure claims under (c)(4)(A)
"should we decline to certify the entire matter"). The Caruso court emphasized that "any
'common issue class' certified under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) must still comply with the other
applicable subdivisions of Rule 23." Id.
112. 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996).
113. Id. at 1234.
114. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION THIRD, supra note 30, § 30.17;
CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 106, § 4.23; 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JURISDICTION § 1780 (2d ed. 1986); Robert G.
Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REv. LITIG. 79, 95-96
(1994); Davis, supra note 3, at 209-10; Romberg, supra note 98, at 298; Woolley, supra note
92, at 500-01.
115. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION THIRD, supra note 30, § 30.17 (noting that the
issue class action has "so far [been] little used"); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
114, § 1770 (opining that "(c)(4) is particularly helpful in enabling courts to restructure
complex cases to meet the other requirements of maintaining a class action"); Romberg,
supra note 98, at 263 ("[C]ases that do not otherwise meet the predominance and superiority
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) can be certified as issue classes.").
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the means to accomplish severance of "the bathwater [complex
individual issues]
6
from the baby [common liability issues]" in mass tort cases.,
While few appellate courts have yet considered the question, it is only a matter
of time before they will be forced to weigh in to the controversy. 117 District courts
everywhere are inundated with requests for certification of issue class actions as an
alternative option to (b)(3) class actions, and many have expressed frustration with
the lack of appellate guidance on the viability of an issue class action
"alternative.",118 Faced with conflicting interpretations of Rule 23(c)(4)(A), district
courts have split along the fault lines of the issue class action. A number of courts
have followed the narrow view of (c)(4)(A), insisting on a whole case
predominance approach,' 19 but an equal number of district courts have championed
the issue class action as a vital aggregation procedure that can operate even where
120
class claims raise predominantly individual issues.
B. The ProperInterpretationof Rule 23(c)(4)(A)
As I concluded in an earlier article analyzing the subject at greater length and
summarized below, this debate should be definitively resolved against the
interpretation of (c)(4)(A) as authorizing expansive issue class actions. 121 Rule 23
demands satisfaction in all class actions of the four prerequisites set forth in
subdivision (a)-numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy-and then
delineates four categories of class actions authorized by the rule: the necessary
party class actions mandated by (b)(1)(A) and (B), the injunctive or declaratory
relief class action authorized by (b)(2), and the discretionary class action permitted
by (b)(3). Subdivision (b), in other words, exhausts all available types of class
actions.
Subdivision (c), on the other hand, addresses various aspects of judicial
management in the conduct of class actions, such as the provision for notice in
(b)(3) class actions,' 22 the timing of a class certification decision, 123 the division of

116. See Romberg, supra note 98, at 256.
117. See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 167 n.12 (2d
Cir. 2001). While the Second Circuit in Robinson addressed the issue class action question
only in dicta, its criticism of the district court for failing to consider issue certification under
(c)(4)(A) suggests its predisposition in favor of an issue class action alternative to (b)(3)
class actions. Id.
118. See, e.g., Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648, 670 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (noting
that (c)(4)(A) itself is "less than clear," and that "courts are not in agreement on the
relationship between these [(b)(3) and (c)(4)(A)] subsections"); In re Am. Honda Motor Co.,
Inc. Dealer Relations Litig., 979 F. Supp. 365, 367 n.3 (D. Md. 1997).
119. See, e.g., Augustin v. Jablonsky, 2001 WL 770839, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 08,
2001) (No. 99CV3126); Cohn v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 F.R.D. 209, 217-18
(D. Conn. 1999); In re Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., Premium Litig., 183 F.R.D. 217, 224
(W.D. Mich. 1998); Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1997), af'd,
161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998).
120. See, e.g., Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 28-31 (E.D.N.Y. 2001);
Campion v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 663, 676 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (conducting
predominance analysis on an issue-by-issue basis rather than on the case as a whole); Slaven
v. BP Am., Inc., 190 F.R.D. 649, 657 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (same).
121. See Hines, supra note 9, at 763-64.
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).

2004]

DANGEROUS ALLURE OF ISSUE CLASS ACTION

a certified class action into subclasses, 124 and the binding nature of class action
judgments.125 The ambiguous language of (c)(4), permitting actions to be brought
"with respect to particular issues," may indeed tempt one to believe the provision
permits a fifth species of class action, one limited to "particular issues" and
therefore immune to the constraints of the (b)(3) predominance requirement. If this
were true, however, why would this class action alternative reside in subdivision
(c) of Rule 23 rather than among the other class action types set forth in
subdivision (b)? Indeed, it appears virtually buried in the middle of subdivision (c),
whose other provisions address matters of judicial management in the conduct of a
class action certified pursuant to subdivision (b). Basic principles of rule
construction preclude the expansive reading of (c)(4)(A) issue class action
proponents have championed. Its placement in the context of Rule 23 as a whole,
coupled with the evidence of its framers' intentions regarding its minor clarifying
role, negates any interpretation of (c)(4)(A) as offering a fifth class action option,
an alternative for courts to consider when (b)(3) cannot be satisfied.
As the Fifth Circuit concluded in Castano v. American Tobacco Co., district

courts should not be permitted to "manufacture predominance through the nimble
use of subdivision (c)(4).', 126 The court reiterated the bifurcation function of
(c)(4)(A), flatly rejecting the notion that the provision authorized an end run around
(b)(3) predominance: "Reading rule 23(c)(4) as allowing a court to sever issues
until the remaining common issue predominates over the remaining individual
issues would eviscerate the predominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3); the result
would be automatic certification in every127case where there is a common issue, a
result that could not have been intended."'
The most persuasive interpretation of this provision is that it represents the
class action version of bifurcation. Similar to Rule 42(b), which provides judicial
authority to bifurcate claims and issues for separate trial, 12 Rule 23(c)(4)(A)
simply permits the severance of common from individual issues, allowing the
on a representational basis even if the latter require
former to be adjudicated 29
individualized assessment. 1
This bifurcation theory of (c)(4)(A) not only makes sense of the provision in
the context of Rule 23 as a whole, it also appears to have been precisely what the
framers of Rule 23 intended. 130 The Advisory Committee note regarding (c)(4)(A),
for example, reflects its understanding of the provision as permitting issues

124. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
126. 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996).
127. Id. The Fifth Circuit more recently confirmed its narrow reading of (c)(4)(A) in an
employment discrimination case, Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422 (5th
Ci. 1998). In that case, the court again rejected any interpretation of (c)(4)(A) to achieve
"piecemeal certification of a class action, which . . . distorts the certification process and
ultimately results in unfairness to all because of the increased uncertainties in what is at
stake in the litigation and in whether the litigation will ever resolve any significant part of
the dispute." Id. at 422 n.17. See also Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 197 F.R.D.
284, 292 n.5 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (citing Castano's analysis of (c)(4) and expressing concern
over "what amounts to piecemeal certification of a class action").
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).

129. Cf. Romberg, supra note 98, at 265-66 (explaining that "[t]he most familiar use of
Rule 23(c)(4)(A)" is to conduct a bifurcated class action).
130. See Hines, supra note 9, at 752-61.
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common to the class to be conducted on a class basis, with the understanding that
"the members of the class may thereafter be required to come in individually and
prove the amounts of their respective claims."' 31 Moreover, the Advisory
Committee's note explicating (b)(3) predominance refers to the same class action
example the Committee cited to explain the proper use of (c)(4)(A). This overlap
underscores the complementary nature of (c)(4)(A) and (b)(3) and the Committee's
desire to emphasize that class actions 32
may still be permitted even when individual
issues must be determined separately.'
The Advisory Committee's deliberations and drafting sessions also reflect its
modest intentions regarding the role of (c)(4)(A). As evidenced in the transcripts of
the Committee's meetings and its correspondence, (c)(4)(A)'s authors viewed the
135
' 4
133
provision as an "obvious point,"' a "picky"' but "perhaps a useable detail."'
The Committee intended for the provision to clarify what was already implicit in
(b)(3) itself: a class action should not be rejected simply because some issues raised
by class claims could not be resolved on a class basis, so long as the class action
contained predominantly common issues. In light of its language, structural
context, and framers' intent, the present Rule 23(c)(4)(A) thus cannot bear the
weight of the expansive issue class action. The following Part considers the policy
and constitutional implications of amending Rule 23 in order expressly to authorize
such a class action type.
III. THE LEGITIMACY AND WISDOM OF THE ISSuE CLASS ACTION

This Article has thus far considered the origins of the issue class action
concept, examining the mass tort landscape that set the stage for its emergence and
explaining its understandable allure. Given that the current class action rule cannot
be interpreted to authorize the issue class action as conceived by its most ardent
proponents, however, the remainder of the Article addresses the much more
challenging policy question: should class action law be expanded to encompass the
issue class action? To meaningfully answer that question requires analysis of
fundamental principles of due process law in the context of representational
litigation, as well as a more pragmatic evaluation of the relative efficiencies at
stake. In short, this Part concludes that the issue class action does not live up to its
promise-it suffers in many respects from the same concerns that have led courts
to strike down mass tort class actions generally, and its narrow common issue
scope threatens to undermine both its legitimacy and its efficacy.

131. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(4)(A) advisory committee's note.
132. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note; see also Hines, supra note 9,
at 755-57 (discussing the overlap between the (c)(4)(A) and (b)(3) Advisory Committee
notes and the case relied upon by the Committee in support of both provisions).
133. Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting, Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 1963. Congressional
Information Service Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure 1935-1988, No. C1-7104-53 [hereinafter Civil Rules Advisory
Comm.]; see also Hines, supra note 9, at 756.
134. Letter from Charles Allen Wright to Benjamin Kaplan (March 30, 1963), in
Congressional Information Service Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure 1935-1988, No. C1-7001-41; see also Hines, supra note 9,
at 758.
135. Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 133; see also Hines, supra note 9, at 758.
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A. IndividualAutonomy and RepresentationalLegitimacy

Over sixty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized a central tenet in the
a
centuries-old traditions of Anglo-American jurisprudence: "one is not bound by' 36
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party."'
More colloquially, individual litigants are said to have a right to their "day in
137
to participate and be heard, to retain counsel of their choice, to pursue a
court,"'
litigation strategy of their own choosing.1 38 In short, litigants ordinarily possess the
due process right to exercise individual autonomy in the adjudication of their legal
rights. 139 To displace that autonomy, as in a class action authorizing
representational litigation,140 the state must offer a compelling justification.
Recent judicial and scholarly attention has focused on the proper boundaries of
class action law, considering a number of proposed justifications for giving binding
effect to a judgment entered on a representative basis.14 ' The state-authorized
preclusion of an individual's day in court in favor of a class action-based
delegation of litigation authority obviously carries with it significant due process
implications, and recent interpretations of the class action rule have emphasized the
due process protections reflected therein. 142 The proper due process analysis for
class actions requires at least two levels of inquiry. First, under what conditions can
the state delegate to a private party the power to represent the rights of others in a
class action? Second, assuming sufficient justification exists for permitting
representational litigation, how ought the class to be governed and what assurances
of adequate representation must be provided to absent class members? 143 While

136. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,40 (1940).
137. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
52, § 4449); see also id. ("A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues
as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.").
138. See John Leubsdorf, ConstitutionalCivil Procedure,63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 608-10
(1984).
139. See Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 63
TEX. L. REV. 571, 572 (1997) (acknowledging that "core precept of the American
constitutional tradition: Individuals have a right 'to be heard and participate in [any]
litigation' which purports to extinguish their rights") (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)).
140. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 114, at 214-15 (noting that "the presence of
representation in adjudication" appears at odds with traditional notions of "the individual
litigant's freedom to make her own choices about how best to conduct a lawsuit").
141. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of
the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 181 (2003) (explicating a "preexistence
principle" that begins with the recognition that "the class action has no roving authority to
alter unilaterally class members' preexisting bundle of rights").
142. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (acknowledging the
"inherent tension between representative suits and the day-in-court ideal"); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)
(concluding that due process forbids exercises of jurisdiction over out-of-state plaintiffs
absent notice, opportunity to be heard, and opportunity to opt out).
143. See Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 390 (emphasizing the need to disentangle the
"structured inquiry to insure that the preconditions for subsuming individual claims within a
collective action are met, and the separate issue of the legitimacy of representational
governance that protects the interests of the absent class members that will be bound to a
final decree"); Nagareda, supra note 141, at 185 (emphasizing, in the context of settlement
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both of these questions deserve close study, the former lies at the heart of this
Article's consideration of the legitimacy and wisdom of the issue class action.
The analysis begins with the legitimizing principles that support the class
actions currently authorized by Rule 23. The first two class actions can be regarded
as class action equivalents to the necessary party rule. 144 In other words, the
interests of either the plaintiff class or the defendant cannot be fairly served by
separate, individual litigation, necessitating adjudication on a class basis. Rule
23(b)(1)(A) class actions protect against the risk of "incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class," just as Rule 19(a)(ii) requires joinder of
persons not named as parties if their absence leaves one of the parties in the lawsuit
"subject to a substantial risk of incurring... inconsistent obligations."' 145 Similarly,
the class action rule justifies (b)(1)(B) classes in order to protect the interests of
class members that would be "substantially impair[ed] or impede[d]" absent
collective adjudication, using the same language found in Rule 19(a)(i) to require
joinder of such persons in a traditional lawsuit. The classic (b)(1)(B) example, as
examined recently by the Supreme Court, is the limited fund. In these situations,
the defendant has a finite, limited fund with which to satisfy all claimants against it,
and individual litigation
will deplete that fund before the claims of all persons
46
could be heard. 1
Finally, Rule 23(b)(2) is also treated as a mandatory, necessary class action
because the class representative seeks injunctive relief on behalf of the class. Even
absent a class action, injunctive relief affects the interests of people other than the
named representative, as they benefit or suffer as a group from the conduct that
forms the basis for the request for injunctive relief. 147 These class actions, then,
also reflect representation by necessity. Just as in the necessary party rule, (b)(1)
and (b)(2) class actions seek to ensure fair treatment of plaintiffs
and defendants by
8
requiring the delegation of authority to litigate collectively.14
Whatever the propriety of the necessity justification, however, it cannot
explain the delegation of representational authority in the (b)(3) class action. In a

class actions, that class certification questions depend on "whether an implied delegation of
power to class counsel exists in the first place, apart from whether that power has been
exercised in a permissible fashion in the class settlement at hand"); cf. John E. Kennedy,
Digging for the Missing Link, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1988) ("The court's first
decision, to recognize a class, grants the group a form of power. Immediately thereafter the
court decides whether the persons seeking to represent the class are worthy
representatives.").
144. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
145. FED. R. Crv. P. 19(a)(ii).
146. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 834-41 (interpreting limited fund rationale).
147. See Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 360 (discussing compulsory nature of (b)(2)
classes because "should the plaintiffs prevail, the defendant will already have been legally
coerced into a defined course of conduct that must be applied to all similarly situated
individuals. These cases are not representative actions in any meaningful sense since
individual claimants have no choice but to have their rights fully adjudicated in this
proceeding.").
148. But see Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement

Classes in Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. Rev. 687, 691 (1997) (criticizing mandatory
nature of (b)(2) class actions based on necessity justification: "[hIn such situations there are
often several plausible courses of action that would improve the situation of the class
members, yet the representatives are seeking, in the name of the class, only one avenue of
relief.").
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(b)(3) class action, the defendant is not at risk of inconsistent obligations-the
payment of damages to some plaintiffs but not others has been consistently rejected
as grounds for requiring collective resolution of claims. 149 Likewise, absent a
limited fund, plaintiffs seeking damages from a defendant cannot argue that another
plaintiff's lawsuit risks the impairment of their interests. Due process forbids issue
50
preclusion against plaintiffs based on a defense judgment in a prior case.
Therefore, a legitimizing principle other than necessity must be found.
The most obvious one may be efficiency. Class action resolution of a common
issue relating to the defendant's conduct potentially serves the efficiency goal of
preventing duplicative litigation of that issue across a large number of individual
lawsuits, saving judicial and litigant resources. 15 1 But efficiency alone cannot
justify the delegation of representational authority. 152 Such a rationale obviously
proves too much. Compared to the resolution of common issues in a class action,
"individualized justice is inherently inefficient."' 153 Due process, however, has
never countenanced sublimation of individual rights solely on the basis of
efficiency. 54 Rather, participation of litigants-the opportunity to be heardrepresents perhaps the most essential mandate of the Due Process Clause.' 55
Nor can the legitimacy of a (b)(3) class action rest on some notion of exigency
in a particular case. If the requirements set forth in the rule cannot be met, it is no
answer to argue that a backlogged docket of cases nevertheless warrants class

149. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984);
ARTHUR MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

43 (1977) ("The risk of paying money to some and not others is not what the rule-makers
intended by the words 'incompatible standards of conduct."').
150. See supra text accompanying note 37.
151. See Rubenstein, supra note 22, at 434 (identifying efficiency as the "primary
argument for aggregation in mass tort cases").
152. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting class certification while railing at the "central planning" model of adjudication that
fixates on efficiency at the expense of other important goals such as accuracy and fairness).
153. Yeazell, supra note 148, at 691; see also Edward Brunet, The Triumph of
Efficiency and Discretionover Competing Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV.LrTIG. 273,
306 (1991) (bemoaning courts' increasing resort to more "efficient" solutions in complex
litigation: "Underlying the triumph of efficiency over competing policies, there are difficult
trade-offs, pitting efficiency against the historically and functionally significant policies of
federalism and fairness.").
154. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (rejecting efficiency
argument that plaintiffs need not provide individual notice to class members who could be
easily identified); cf Miller, supra note 28 (criticizing courts for appearing to place judicial
efficiency interests above litigants' fundamental right to a day in court).
155. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and
the Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476 (1986) (noting Supreme

Court's emphasis on the value of "the individual's interest in having an opportunity to
convince the decisionmaker that he deserves the right at issue"); see also Peralta v. Heights
Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988) (upholding due process right to notice of default
judgment proceeding even where defendant had no meritorious defense); Societe
Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197, 209 (1958) ("[There are constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid
of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity
for a hearing on the merits of his cause.").
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action certification. 56 The Supreme Court's recent class action jurisprudence
wisely has eschewed any such instrumental view of the class action in
contemplating the authority for representational litigation. As it acknowledged in
Amchem, "a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the
most secure, fair and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos
exposure."'1 57 But representational litigation cannot be justified on those grounds
alone. 158
One class action scholar, analyzing modem class action law through the lens of
historic group litigation theories, has argued that representation of interests
provides the most persuasive justification for class actions today.' 59 While the
demand for similarity of interests is indeed reflected throughout Rule 23, shared
interests must be regarded as a necessary but not a sufficient justification for
divesting individual litigation autonomy. As one critic of the interest theory
cogently explained, this justification of representational litigation "questions the
capacity of individuals to make intelligent choices regarding representation,
participation, and the pursuit of their own interests. At its core, [it] rests upon a
judicial paternalism that is paradoxically at odds with individual autonomy and
other democratic values."'60
In cases involving significant personal claims for damages, where individual
autonomy interests run high and representation cannot be justified by necessity, a
stronger justification for empowering representational litigation must be found than
efficiency, exigency, or common interest. Representation by consent, or implied

156. Cf.Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 825, 862 (1999) (rejecting argument that
class action standards should be relaxed due to the unusual exigent circumstances of the case
at hand); In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that class
action failed (b)(3) requirements despite "compelling" argument that proposed procedure "is
the only realistic way of trying these cases").
157. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
158. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 52, § 4455, at 486 (cautioning against
temptation to "subordinate traditional insistence on individual control of individual claims to
a new view that a generally fair procedure for aggregate disposition satisfies due process,
never mind that occasional results will be untoward"); Nagareda, supra note 141, at 184 ("A
good deal, in itself, cannot make for a permissible class, however, because the permissibility
of the class is what legitimizes the dealmaking power of class counsel in the first place.").
159. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LmGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS AcTION 15 (1987). One of the earliest examples of group litigation was based on class
members' shared association or community, such as representation by a union or residents of
a community challenging an infringement of a right held by the community. See, e.g., Mayor
of York v. Pilkington, 25 Eng. Rep. 946 (Ch. 1737). Such cases, however, depend on an
association among class members that preexists the litigation, which will not be found in
cases where numerous, dispersed individuals suffer harm that gives rise to individual claims
for money damages. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 383-84 ("Although the extent to which
these historical examples [of prior association] provide relevant models for today can
reasonably be debated, it seems doubtful that individuals who are simply seeking money
damages in a class action because of a common injury .. .share any meaningful prior
associations or community."); Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 366 (discussing a need to find
legitimizing principle for (b)(3) class actions where "there is no preexisting political or
organizational vehicle that can claim an independent source of authority to speak for the
collective").
160. Kennedy, supra note 143, at 1119; see also Coffee, supra note 61, at 384
(identifying the shared interest theory as "[p]robably the weakest normative basis for
deeming individuals to belong to a collective entity that can determine their rights").
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consent, provides that justification.16 ' The central tenet of representation in a
political democracy, of course, is that "the actions of government must be based
upon the consent of the governed."'162 Representation in litigation differs in
important respects from political representation,' 63 but the consent theory of
representation best explains the delegation in (b)(3) class actions to private parties
(class representatives) of binding, representational authority over individuals who
would otherwise enjoy the right to litigant autonomy. 164 The legitimacy of a (b)(3)
class action, therefore, rests on finding sufficient indicia of consent in "the
uncharted territory between... actual
consent ...and the political consent thought
165
to legitimate public legislation."'
While it does not require actual consent from each represented class
member, 66 the structure of (b)(3) itself focuses on a consent-based analysis. The
consent of class members may be inferred after a finding of adequate class
cohesiveness (found through the predominance requirement), coupled with
consideration of the viability of individual lawsuits, the personal nature of the
claim, and the efficiencies to be gained by collective litigation (inquiries mandated
by the superiority requirement). If predominance and superiority requirements have
been met, a court may reasonably infer consent to the delegation of representational
authority to the class representative and class counsel. And the rule further

161. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After Amchem
Products-Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give away Their Clients' Money, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1541, 1557 (1998) (asserting that "personal consent is [no] less important with
regard to surrendering one's rights in a [(b)(3) class action] than with regard to other
fundamental decisions").
162. James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 458 (1999); see
also Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1193 (1998) (quoting SIDNEY
HOOK, POLITICAL POWER AND PERSONAL FREEDOM 67-68 (1965) ('This capacity to choose is
an important aspect of humanity and has value in itself.")).
163. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 384 ("But legislative bodies are different from the
class action in a variety of ways, the most notable of which is that the representative is held
accountable through regular elections."); Nagareda, supra note 141, at 157 (emphasizing that
unlike public legislation, such as the federal 9/11 Fund statutory scheme, class action law
does not authorize alteration of preexisting substantive rights of class members).
164. See Kennedy, supra note 143, at 1115. Professor Kennedy argues that "[a] number
of conceptual analogies are much closer to the concept of class representation than the
concept of political representation," including law relating to corporations or agency
principles in tort or contract law. Yet those concepts similarly require consideration of the
consent (actual or implied) of the represented. Other analogies, such as the guardian
relationship involving minors or incompetents, are based on necessity of representation.
165. Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class
Action, 115 HARv. L. REV. 747, 795 (2002); see also Coffee, supra note 61, at 381 (opining
on difficulty of determining in a class action, short of actual consent, "when consent should
be inferred").
166. Cf.Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-13 (1985) (rejecting the
argument that due process requires actual consent: "Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively
request inclusion would probably impede the prosecution of those class actions involving an
aggregation of small individual claims, where a large number of claims are [sic] required to
make it economical to bring suit."); Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 370 ("[A]ny requirement
that the [actual] consent of all the governed is the prerequisite to judicial approval of the
maintenance or settlement of a class action threatens the viability of this aggregative tool.").
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recognizes individual autonomy by notifying class members of the action on their
behalf and enabling them to rebut the judicial inference of their consent by opting
out of the class action.
If indeed consent theory best justifies representational litigation in (b)(3) class
actions, the issue class action should be evaluated against that model. The
following sections will consider in turn each of the (b)(3) factors that, in toto,
permit a court to infer class consent to representational litigation. The beginning of
that analysis is consideration of the normative value of predominance, the evasion
of which is the primary goal and appeal of the issue class action.
B. The Issue ClassAction and the Evasion of Predominance

The predominance inquiry serves a vital role in permitting an inference of
consent to representational litigation in a (b)(3) class action. Its presence in the rule
makes clear that the bare existence of a common question, all that Rule 23(a)
commonality requires, will not suffice to wrest litigative autonomy from class
members who have the right to pursue individual litigation. 167 Rather, the
predominance test demands a finding of supercommonality in the proposed class
action. It requires careful assessment of the overall character of the class action,
weighing the issues common to the class against the set of issues that separate the
class. And that overall view of class claims must reveal that class members are
more alike than different. When the claim of the class representative varies little
from the individuals whom she seeks to represent, absent class members can trust
that the litigation resource and strategy decisions of such a representative would
equally serve their interests.' 68 In other words, predominance serves an important
role in satisfying courts that the interests of absent class members are so well
protected that69 one can rationally infer consent to this extraordinary form of
adjudication. 1
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court emphasized the

safeguarding function served by predominance: to prevent representational
litigation in cases where class members' claims are too diverse.' 70 In Amchem, the
Court struck down the proposed class action for failure to satisfy the predominance
requirement, pointing to the disparate nature of class members' claims and the
paucity of common issues.' 7 1 The "mission" of the (b)(3) predominance inquiry, as

167. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623-24 (1997) (explaining
that "the predominance criterion is far more demanding" than the 23(a) commonality
requirement).
168. Cf.Coffee, supra note 161, at 1557 (observing that "trust is the precondition to
consent").
169. See Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of
JudicialRulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal

Rule 23, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 461, 467 (1997) ("[Blecause of the predominance of common
questions, it was also reasonable to suppose that class members were willing to have the
class attorneys represent them. No such supposition can be justified in the mass tort situation
in which the claims are large and diverse.").
170. 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (referring to the Rule 23 "standards set for the protection
of absent class members" and the "safeguards provided by the Rule 23(a) and (b) classqualifying criteria").
171. Id.at 624 ("Given the greater number of questions peculiar to the several
categories of class members, and to individuals within each category, and the significance of
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the Court explained, is to "assure the class cohesion that legitimates representative
action in the first place. The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation."'' 72 Representational litigation cannot be authorized, in other words,
where class members' claims are riddled with varying factual and legal questions
that belie class unity. 173
Some commentators have questioned the cohesiveness-ensuring function of
predominance, criticizing the Court for embracing an unduly technical, formalistic
view of Rule 23.174 First, cohesiveness does not stand out in the rulemaking history
as the chief aim of the Advisory Committee in drafting the predominance
requirement. As Professor John Coffee argues:
Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements seem much more closely linked to
considerations of judicial efficiency than to concerns about absent class
members ....

[T]he more closely one examines the context in which

the 'predominance' test was framed as part of the 1966 revisions of
Rule 23, the more likely it seems that the draftsmen's primary 75intent
was to confine Rule 23(b)(3) within judicially manageable limits. 1
Indeed, the advisory committee notes on predominance contend that "[iut is
only where this predominance exists that economies can be achieved by means of
the class-action device."' 176 But the committee also recognized that (b)(3) class
actions could only be justified where those efficiencies could be accomplished for
"persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing
about other undesirable results.' 77
While the framers' intentions with respect to predominance may be
ambiguous, conceptualizing predominance as serving the goal of efficiency
certainly does not preclude service of another function, ensuring cohesiveness. The
Eleventh Circuit has embraced this dual nature of the predominance test:
The predominance and efficiency criteria are of course intertwined.
When there are predominant issues of law or fact, resolution of those
issues in one proceeding efficiently resolves those issues with regard to
all claimants in the class. When there are no predominant issues of law
or fact, however . . . class treatment would be either singularly

inefficient, as one court attempts to resolve diverse claims from around
the country in its courtroom, or unjust, as the various factual and legal
nuances of particular claims are lost in the press to clear the lone court's
docket. "8
those uncommon questions, any overarching dispute about the health consequences of
asbestos exposure cannot satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard.").
172. Id. at 623; see also id. ("The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.").
173. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 22, at 378 (acknowledging that (b)(3)
predominance "ensures the cohesive nature of the group").
174. See, e.g, Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 351 (bemoaning the Court's "retreat to rules
formalism").
175. Coffee, supra note 61, at 400 (criticizing Amchem's "cohesion thesis [because] its
historical foundations are shaky").
176. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's note, 1966 amendment.
177. Id.

178. Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1006 n.12 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
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Moreover, our task is not to determine what goals its framers may have
intended predominance to serve. Indeed, in the context of considering the policy
implications of authorizing a new form of class action never conceived by those
framers, it would seem quite anachronistic to impose limits on the role it should
play in such a class action solely based on its intended meaning in broader class
actions. Therefore, whatever its framers intended, the important inquiry here is to
consider the functions predominance does serve in the class actions it facilitates. As
it serves both efficiency and cohesiveness goals, its satisfaction assists in the
process of determining the propriety of inferring consent.
Professor Coffee also argues that predominance should not be interpreted as a
guarantor of cohesiveness because satisfaction of the prerequisites in Rule 23(a)
adequately serves that goal. Typicality in particular, Coffee asserts, assures that
"'typical' representatives will have interests sufficiently aligned with those of other
class members" to authorize class litigation. 179 Because of this "overlap[]," Coffee
explains that it would be "redundant to read the predominance test of Rule 23(b)(3)
as having the same goal in mind."' 180 Others, however, have explained (b)(1) and
(b)(2) class action requirements as similarly, albeit through different means,
seeking to ensure class
cohesion. 181 And, of course, many of the Rule 23
82
requirements overlap. 1
At the very least, predominance already overlaps with commonality-by
183
requiring not only common questions but predominantly common questions.
Why, then, should we deem it redundant to assume that predominance also requires
a degree of class cohesiveness higher than Rule 23(a) typicality and adequacy? As
acknowledged by the Court in Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp., "the same concerns that
drive the threshold findings under Rule 23(a) may also influence the propriety of
the certification decision under the subdivisions of Rule 23(b)."' 184 One may indeed
rightly criticize Rule 23 for permitting (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes on a showing of
less cohesiveness than required of a (b)(3) class, 8 5 but that argument only suggests

179. Coffee, supra note 61, at 402.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
299, 315 (describing how mandatory (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions "tend to be cohesive
groups because the rule requires that the members have similar interests in the subject matter
of the litigation or be seeking relief applicable to all of them"); Rubenstein, supra note 22, at
378 (explaining that the limited fund in (b)(1)(B) class actions provides the "necessary
conceptual glue" to ensure class cohesion).
182. See, e.g., CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 106, § 4.22 ("There is considerable
overlap between Rule 23(a)(2) and (b)(3)."); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 52, § 1764 ("Some
of the tests that have been suggested for applying [typicality] also could be employed to
determine whether one of the other prerequisites in Rule 23(a) has been met.").
183. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 609 (1997) (recognizing that
"Rule 23(a)(2)'s 'commonality' requirement is subsumed under, or superseded by, the more
stringent Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that questions common to the class 'predominate over'
other questions").
184. 527 U.S. 815, 856 n.31 (1999).
185. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 61, at 435 (requiring heightened scrutiny of class
cohesiveness in mandatory class actions "makes good normative sense, [and] supplies the
necessary deterrent to prevent the misuse of Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions as a
means of evading the greater procedural protections built into Rule 23(b)(3)"); cf. YEAZELL,
supra note 159, at 253 (critiquing the mandatory nature of the (b)(2) class action because it
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heightening the overly lax scrutiny mandated by Rule 23(a). It does not support an
interpretation of (b)(3) predominance that focuses exclusively on efficiency, nor
does it suggest that consent to representational litigation should not require high
standards of class cohesiveness to protect absent class members' autonomy.
For some advocates of the issue class action, the predominance requirement
has been interpreted either as irrelevant or automatically satisfied.18 6 Indeed, this
reflects the issue class action's primary appeal: that it excludes pesky individual
issues and therefore evades the predominance obstacle to class certification."7 But
if predominance serves to confirm class cohesiveness, thereby permitting an
inference of consent to representational litigation, an issue class action lacking
predominance also lacks legitimacy. Courts cannot indulge the assumption that
class members would consent to adjudication on their behalf by a class
representative whose claim varies widely from their own.
Even scholars who accept the cohesiveness function of predominance assert
that issue class actions help courts better accomplish that goal.188 By severing
issues common to the class from the predominantly individual issues, it is argued,
class cohesion is strengthened by the issue class action: "As the scope of the
proposed collective resolution changes, the degree of cohesiveness changes
accordingly: a class that might not be sufficiently cohesive to be resolved
collectively in its entirety may well be sufficiently cohesive as to a subset of
common issues to warrant certification of those issues.' 8 9 Therefore,
predominance is automatically satisfied by an issue class action, and perfect class
cohesion is achieved.
This analysis fails to take into account, however, the fact that even under a
whole case (b)(3) class action the class representative never litigates individual
issues on behalf of absent class members. 9° So the delegation of litigative
authority to the representative only ever applies to common issues. If predominance
serves to assure consent to that delegation on the basis that class members are more
homogenous than diverse, one cannot pretend that those disparities disappear just
because individual issues will be litigated elsewhere. Whether class members are
forced to litigate their individual issues pursuant to the class action centralizing
device or free to adjudicate those issues in a forum of their own choosing, the class
is no more or less cohesive with respect to the significance of the common issues.
Issue class actions, therefore, contemplate representational litigation without
regard to one of the fundamental bases for inferring consent to that extraordinary

is "more likely than in the (b)(3) cases that the interests of the group's members will conflict
and will be least amenable to abstract assessment").
186. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 913, 958 (1998) (bemoaning as "unnecessary" the current class action
law that bars (c)(4)(A) issue class actions "unless there is a prior determination under
23(b)(3) that class claims predominate over the individual aspects of the case").
188. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 222-23; Weber, supra note 108, at 1184
(criticizing Amchem's predominance analysis for failing to recognize the (c)(4)(A) issue
class action alternative: "Despite the disparities among the members of a class like
Amchem's, there is no reason to eschew the efficiencies of classwide determinations on such
issues as whether a reasonable finder of fact could determine general causation in plaintiff's
favor ... ").
189. Romberg, supra note 98, at 295.
190. See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
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imposition on individual autonomy rights, the predominance of common issues.
Indeed, it has been argued that the evasion of that "obstacle" to mass tort class
actions should be hailed as a step in the right direction to resolving the mass tort
dilemma. 19' But if predominance, as this Article contends, serves a vital role in
justifying binding adjudication of certain issues common to the class, then issue
class actions seek to authorize representation unwarranted by consent theory.
C. Superiority and Consent

Even its most ardent advocates acknowledge that issue class actions should
satisfy the superiority requirement of (b)(3) as a check on unwarranted issue class
certification.' 92 But at least two of the superiority factors focus on individual
autonomy concerns that may call into question the almost tautological superiority
argument in favor of the issue class action: that half a loaf must be better than
none. 193 Consideration of the first two superiority factors helps assure courts of the
propriety of inferring class consent to the class action, thereby shifting the burden
onto class members to rebut that inference by opting out of the class action. The
remaining superiority factors, while important in assessing the practical benefits to
be gained by an issue class action, are less relevant to questions of consent. 94
The first superiority factor, consideration of an individual's interest in
controlling her own litigation, fares no differently for issue class actions than for
whole case class actions. Related to the predominance inquiry discussed above, this
factor tests whether the claims raised by the proposed class can viably be
maintained in individual lawsuits.' 95 The stakes at issue, of course, enormously
impact this assessment. In negative value cases, where the cost of litigation exceeds
the likely recovery, 196 "separate suits would be impracticable," and class members'
interest in controlling the litigation must be considered more a "theoretic" than a

191. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 726-27 (W.D. Mo. 1985);
Romberg, supra note 98, at 298 (explaining that the (b)(3) superiority inquiry applies to
issue class actions: "[Tihe superiority analysis becomes central to determining whether a

case should be certified as to common issues, or whether other available means of resolving
the controversy would result in greater efficiency and fairness.").
193. See Romberg, supra note 98, at 298-326 (conducting superiority analysis of the
issue class action).
194. See infra notes 227-68 and accompanying text (discussing manageability concerns,
the fourth superiority factor, and other practical implications of the issue class action). The
third superiority factor, "the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum," appears chiefly concerned with the convenience of the
forum chosen by the class representative. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C). But it would not seem
to be a factor that weighs particularly for or against the creation of an issue class action,
although it may mildly influence the court in its task of divining the likelihood of class
consent to litigation in that particular forum. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 52, § 1780, at
573 (indicating that court should consider various convenience matters including "the
location of the interested parties, the availability of witnesses and the evidence, and the
condition of the court's calendar") (footnotes omitted).
195. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
196. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 429-32 (discussing-the negative value class action,
"the classic small claimant class action where the option of individual litigation does not
exist as a practical matter").
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realistic one.1 97 In such cases, it may be reasonable to infer consent to
representational litigation because the alternative of litigating the claim
individually is not economically feasible. 198 On the other hand, in cases involving
high value claims, the superiority analysis suggests that courts should be loathe to
compromise individual autonomy in favor of class representation.1 99 As the
Supreme Court suggested in Amchem, it may be less reasonable to assume class
members would delegate litigation authority to another when "individual stakes are
,2
high.

00

One scholar has suggested an additional theory for assessing an individual's
interest in controlling the litigation, urging that the personal versus impersonal
dichotomy of the rights at issue "suppose[] that litigant autonomy and individual
participation make their strongest normative claims when state adjudicative power
focuses directly on personal attributes of an individual rather than on aggregative
characteristics of a group." 20' Thus, the personal nature of a personal injury claim,
for example, suggests a strong individual autonomy interest that should
20 2 not be
trumped solely on the basis of a similar interest shared by other claimants.
The issue class action does not appreciably alter the superiority analysis under
either the personal/impersonal theory or the high/low stakes approach to
determining the significance of class members' interest in individual autonomy.

197. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note, 1966 amendment; see also Edward
F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 512 (1987) ("The
desire of individual class members to control their own suits carries little weight in class
actions involving small amounts of money.").
198. See Rubenstein, supra note 22, at 394 (superiority of representational litigation in
negative value cases may be justified "precisely because of the limited nature of the
individual rights at issue"). But see Weber, supra note 108, at 1206 (questioning the
argument that "consent may safely be assumed when the stakes are small and the interests of
the class members are clearly identical," particularly because "the smaller the claim, the less
incentive any class member has to monitor the attorney").
199. Cf In re Stucco Litig., 175 F.R.D. 210, 218 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (questioning whether
a class action can achieve economies of scale in cases where the "not insignificant damages

sought by the plaintiffs and the number of independent actions already filed" reflect a
likelihood that many high value class members will opt out of the class). But see Howard M.
Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination
Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 464 (2000) (explaining that even in
informal aggregation, it would be "wrong to pretend that the individual litigant in massive
multi-suit litigation is truly autonomous. Not only does the individual litigant often lack
significant control over his own lawyer, that lawyer .often works as part of a large and
complicated network of interdependent lawyers.") (footnote omitted); Edward F. Sherman,
Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REv. LrT1G. 231, 250 (1991)
(noting that the existence of related suits unavoidably affects litigant autonomy: "The reality
that related cases impact on one another and that there are patterns in their disposition
undercuts the pure theory of the virtue of individuation.").
200. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997); see also id. at 617
(noting that "the Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of 'the rights of
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their
opponents into court at all"') (citation omitted).
201. Bone, supra note 114, at 292-93 (footnote omitted).
202. See, e.g., id.; Richard L,Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via
Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 858, 889 (1995) (discussing (b)(3) requirement that courts
consider "the uniquely personal nature of the claims compromised"); Roger H. Trangsrud,
Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 69, 74-76.
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With respect to high stakes or highly personal claims, it seems unlikely that consent
to representational litigation of particular issues would be any more justified in an
issue class action than in an ordinary (b)(3) class action. One might argue that the
issue class action permits class members to retain greater individual autonomy
because they are delegating less to the issue class action representatives.2 °3 But it is
not at all clear that we should assume class members would be more likely to
delegate representational authority when the class action can accomplish less for
them.2 "°
Individual autonomy interests are also reflected in (b)(3)'s second superiority
factor, the "extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class." 20 5 Again, the underlying message
of (b)(3) is that class representation may be less warranted (i.e., consent to
representation less easily inferred), and less fair to absent class members, where
individual litigation is so feasible an option that would-be class members are
already exercising it: "Moreover, the existence of litigation indicates that some of
the interested parties have decided that individual actions are an acceptable
way to
20 6
proceed, and even may consider them preferable to a class action.,
The issue class action offers no answer to the concerns courts have raised
regarding the propriety of inferring consent to representational litigation in cases
where individual lawsuits remain a viable alternative for class members. 20 7 Prior
inconsistent judgments, one of the hobgoblins of collateral estoppel, ° s need not be
taken into account in an issue class action, enabling broad issue preclusion even in
the face of previous verdicts in defendant's favor. But those inconsistent judgments
may undermine any confidence in the accuracy or fairness of a class-wide
resolution of that issue. 20 9 As Judge Posner has argued, allowing individual trials of
disputed common issues to proceed results in a more "robust" resolution of that
issue: "[T]he pattern that results will reflect a consensus, or at least a pooling of
judgment, of many different tribunals. For this consensus or maturing of judgment
the district court proposes to substitute a single trial before a single jury instructed
in accordance with no actual law of any jurisdiction ..."210

203. See Davis, supra note 3, at 233 (advocating "use of the mass tort class action in its
limited issue format [to] serve the goal of resolving costly and protracted litigation");
Romberg, supra note 98, at 302-03 (arguing that issue class actions "allow[] plaintiffs to
aggregate their resources such that the results of litigation or settlement more accurately
reflect the merits of the underlying controversy").
204. See Fisher v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 181 F.R.D. 365, 368 (N.D. 111. 1998)
(doubting whether "enough economies of time and effort would accrue to the judicial system
from resolving the common issues on a class basis to justify the diminution of individual
autonomy that inherently results from the certification of a class").
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B).
206. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 52, § 1780, at 570.

207. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616-17 (1997).
208. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
209. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002)
("Getting things right the first time would be an accident.").
210. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-300 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
In re Bridgestone/Firestone,288 F.3d at 1020 ("Markets [unlike the single adjudication,
'central planning' model of class adjudication] ... use diversified decisionmaking to supply
and evaluate information . .

.

. [Although] [t]his method looks 'inefficient' from the

planner's perspective ....
it produces more information [and] more accura[cy] ....
").
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If we regard with skepticism the one-time, one-jury, one-roll-of-the-dice
adjudication of an issue that might reasonably be found for or against the class,
lowering the threshold requirements in an issue class action to allow such
representational litigation would seem at best highly imprudent, 211 especially in the
context of immature torts. 212 Again, the issue class action does not lessen any of the
autonomy and fairness concerns that have proved troubling in the context of mass
tort class actions generally. Indeed, the issue class action would seem to supply
even less justification for inferring class213consent to representational litigation
because the class action accomplishes less.
D. Meaningful Opt-Out Rights and Consent
The right to individually rebut the inference of consent, to exit the class action,
has been a frequent subject of academic commentary. 214 Much of the scholarly
debate has focused on governance principles and the vital role the right of exit
plays in curbing potential abuses by class counsel in the context of settlement class
actions. 215 But concerns have also been raised about the degree to which the right to
opt out provides a vital opportunity for class members to reject representational
litigation of their claims even by a legitimate representative.216 Rule 23(c)(2)
guarantees class members the right to exclude themselves from (b)(3) class

211. Cf In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The
systemic urge to aggregate litigation must not be allowed to trump our dedication to
individual justice, and we must take care that each individual plaintiff's-and defendant's-

cause not be lost in the shadow of a towering mass litigation.") (quoting In re Brooklyn
Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 853 (2d Cir. 1992)). But see Shapiro, supra note
187, at 935 (arguing that "it makes little sense to defer class certification of what appears to
be a mass tort, suitable in some respects at least for class treatment, until the requisite
number of individual actions has been ground through the system").
212. See, e.g., supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Benner v. Becton Dickinson Co., 214 F.R.D. 157, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
("The sheer number of issues left for [individual litigation] is emblematic of the futility of
issue certification on design defect and negligent design."); Begley v. Acad. Life Ins. Co.,
200 F.R.D. 489, 498 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (rejecting issue class action because "resolution of
issues of the duties owed by the defendants would save the plaintiffs little or no time or cost
in their individual suits").
214. Compare Weber, supra note 108, at 1196 (applauding the "strategic behavior" of
high value plaintiffs who opt out of a class action, "striving to obtain the highest recovery
for his or her injuries"), with Shapiro, supra note 187, at 937-38 (questioning the propriety
of opt-out rights in light of argument for "entity treatment of the class"), and Michael A.
Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of Opt-out Rights in
Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 153 (1997) (suggesting that "courts should not
be reticent to curtail opt-out rights or impose mandatory classes under appropriate
circumstances").
215. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 61, at 434-38 (arguing that right of exit better serves
goal of client autonomy and assurance of loyal representation than Amchem's cohesiveness
rationale); Nagareda, supra note 141, at 173 (identifying right of exit as an effective check
on the monopoly power of class counsel).
216. See Perino, supra note 214, at 106 ("From a normative perspective, opt-out rights
preserve traditional notions of individual justice by 'institutionaliz[ing] and enlarg[ing] the
central value of claimant autonomy."') (alteration in original) (quoting Schuck, supra note
93, at 964).
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actions, 217 underscoring the importance of consent to representational authority in
such class actions. 2 18 While the requirements of (a) and (b)(3) combine to permit
courts to infer class members' consent to the delegation of litigative authority,
(c)(2) makes clear that this inference may be repudiated by a class member who
opts to retain litigant autonomy. 21 9 Failure to opt out, of course, cannot constitute
consent to representational litigation that otherwise lacks legitimacy under (a) or
(b)(3).22 ° Indeed, some have questioned whether the failure to opt out should be
interpreted as conferring consent even when the (b)(3) class action prerequisites
have been satisfied.2 2
There may be good reason to be skeptical about the ability of class members to
fully understand the class notice, 2 and to make informed decisions on whether to
223
sit passively by or act to exclude themselves from the class:

217. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (requiring notice to advise each (b)(3) class member that
"the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion").
218. See Joan Steinman, Managing Punitive Damages: A Role for Mandatory "Limited
Generosity" Classes and Anti-Suit Injunctions?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1043, 1087
(2001) ("Failure to exercise the right to opt out can be the basis for an inference of consent
to prosecution of a suit on a class member's behalf.").
219. Professor David Shapiro has urged a reexamination of individual rights to opt out
of a (b)(3) class action: "If there is a clear need for an unconditional right to opt out, one
wonders about the soundness of the underlying decision to allow class treatment." Shapiro,
supra note 187, at 938.
220. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that, in
addition to the right to opt out of a (b)(3) class action, "the Due Process Clause of course
requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent
class members"); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Antisuit Injunctions and PreclusionAgainst Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1148, 1169 (1998) (explaining that "the inference of consent from class members'
failure to opt out" cannot be interpreted in collateral litigation to bar due process challenges
regarding the legitimacy and binding effect of the class action judgment); Graham C. Lilly,
Modeling Class Actions: The RepresentativeSuit as an Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1008,
1047 (2003) (explaining the same); cf. Coffee, supra note 61, at 432 (arguing that Amchem
"probably forecloses" the argument that "implied consent [to attorney allocation decisions]
should be found in any opt-out class action where class members fail to opt out after
notice").
221. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIz. L.
REV. 923, 960 (1998) (advocating an opt-in class action proposal and questioning, at least in
the mass tort context, the strongly held belief "that the failure to opt out represents genuine,
informed consent to be included in the class"); Coffee, supra note 61, at 422 (noting that
"rational apathy" rather than meaningful consent may explain low opt-out rates among class
members in most settlement class actions involving "modest claims and no real alternative
because their claims are typically too small to litigate on an individual basis").
222. See Miller & Crump, supra note 86, at 22 ("Much of what lawyers write, however,
including many class action notices, is incomprehensible to average citizens. The lawyerly
concern for completeness and accuracy may conflict with the objective of intelligibility.");
Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in ClassActions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1215 (1982).
223. Concerns about the content and comprehensibility of class action notices have
recently resulted in amendments to Rule 23 and "illustrative" notice forms published by the
Federal Judicial Center. The revised Rule 23(c)(2)(B), effective December 1, 2003, requires
(b)(3) class notices to "concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood language"
detailed information about the proposed class action and how it may affect class members'
rights. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). This renewed attention to the sufficiency and clarity of
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It is beyond the experience or expectation of reasonable citizens that the
failure to respond to what looks like a slightly unusual piece of junk
mail constitutes assent to the solicitation of employment by selfselected counsel desiring to represent the recipient in an action
involving serious personal injury or death. There is no reason to believe
that a serious personal injury claimant desires to be represented by class
counsel.224

The meaningful exercise of the right to opt out of an issue class action would
be undermined by these same concerns regarding the adequacy of notice; indeed,
arguably more so. Issue class action notices would have an abstract quality to them
even more confusing than the legalese of an ordinary class action. A class member
rationally examining the notice would observe that the class action does not seek to
adjudicate any of the myriad of individual aspects to her claim, including
proximate causation, injury, affirmative defenses, damages, and a potential host of
other liability issues. In that context, where the class litigation may be in a distant
forum and does not hold out the promise of any remedy, an issue class member
may very well fail to appreciate the significance of her failure to take steps to opt
out of the class action. If it is difficult for most class members to comprehend the
class notice in ordinary class actions that at least warn them that the class action
seeks to adjudicate their whole claim, an issue class action notice exacerbates the
problem.
While this notice problem may simply amount to one of proper
draftsmanship, 225 one must take seriously the great likelihood that issue class
members will fail to comprehend the highly abstract nature of the proposed class
action and to recognize that representational litigation of even a part of their claim
may not serve their best interests. In this respect, the potential for issue class action
members not to "appreciate the gravity" of the opt-out rights at issue may parallel
concerns raised in class actions affecting individuals who have not yet manifested
injury.226 While obviously a much less compelling argument, the ability of
laypersons to comprehend the abstract nature of the issue class action should
seriously be questioned.

class notices may help address some of the concerns regarding meaningful exercises of optout rights.
224. Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 169, at 467-68 (footnotes omitted); see also
Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1943,
1949 (2000) ("The level of informed consent represented by a failure to opt out is likely to
be as high in body-injury mass torts as anywhere, but still leaves much to be desired."). But
see Weber, supra note 106, at 1206 (arguing that while the failure of class action notice
recipients to "take the time to understand the form or take it to someone who can" may be a
concern in "small-claims cases, it is very dubious for larger-scale mass torts cases").
225. See supra notes 229-32; Weber, supra note 108, at 1206 (suggesting that many
notice problems may be cured by "better, more sensitive drafting").
226. Cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (acknowledging
significant concerns about whether adequate notice "could ever be given to legions so
unselfconscious and amorphous"); Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 367 (explaining that "the
benefit [of opting out] standing alone offers little" to class members who have not yet
manifested injury and do not have sufficient "knowledge of the reason to opt out"); Weber,
supra note 108, at 1203 (noting that future claimants "were in no position to appreciate the
gravity of the settlement decision when they had not yet manifested any kind of symptoms
from the exposure [to asbestos]").
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E. Evaluating the Benefits of the Issue Class Action
Before embarking on an issue class action course that threatens to undermine
fundamental principles of consent and individual autonomy, it will be vitally
important to assess the benefits that might justify such a risk. The issue class
action's chief advantage, of course, is that it offers to resolve some aspect of
liability on a class basis, even though the predominantly individual elements of
plaintiffs' claims remain to be adjudicated on an individual basis in separately filed
lawsuits. This benefit may indeed be a significant one in some cases, preventing
duplicative litigation and providing a vehicle for plaintiffs to pool resources. But
the issue class action has been primarily heralded as providing a solution to the
problems that have doomed recent mass tort class actions, permitting class action
treatment of cases that otherwise could not be certified under (b)(3).227 Close
analysis of the issue class action in this context, however, suggests that it may
promise more than it can deliver. Many of the obstacles that have frustrated mass
tort actions continue to dog the issue class action, and its very limited scope may
undermine its utility. Something, in other words, may not actually be better than
nothing.
It is certainly true that by carving out the individual issues raised by class
claims, the issue class action would be more manageable than a whole case (b)(3)
class action.2 28 Courts have struggled, often in vain, to find some means by which
to adjudicate complex individual issues such as reliance, proximate cause, injury,
affirmative defenses, and damages in a class action. 229 The issue class action offers
to relieve the certifying court of the burden of individual issues, while still
3
permitting
efficiencies
be of
gained
by trial
of the common
Because
manageability
is a majorto part
the (b)(3)
superiority
analysis, issues.2
and has 0proven
to

227. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
("Severing issues for trial [pursuant to (c)(4)(A)] enhances rather than detracts from the
manageability of such cases."); Davis, supra note 3, at 231 (extolling the virtue of the issue
class action in reducing manageability problems); Romberg, supra note 98, at 313
(describing Rule 23(c)(4)(A) issue certification as "an especially valuable tool for making a
class action manageable").
229. For example, the Fifth Circuit has rejected innovative lower court plans to
adjudicate individual issues on either an aggregate basis or on the basis of extrapolation from
a sample of class plaintiffs. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir.
1998); In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit has also
rebuked the suggestion that individual issues can be adjudicated on an abbreviated basis in
class actions, emphasizing that the district court offered "no credible support for the
proposition that our rules of evidence and procedure may be altered or diminished in any
manner, in actions of this kind, other than those recognized to be within the sound discretion
of the district court." Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1020 (5th Cir. 1992), reh'g en
banc grantedon other grounds, 990 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993), appeal dismissed,53 F.3d 663
(5th Cir. 1994).
230. Of course, the judicial burden of managing those individual issues does not go
away simply because they are excluded from the issue class action. Courts in other
jurisdictions must still manage those issues in the context of any individual lawsuits that
follow a favorable class verdict in an issue class action.
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be an insurmountable hurdle for many mass tort class actions, 231 the manageability
benefits of the issue class action cannot be overlooked.232
But due to the complex nature of many mass tort claims, significant
manageability concerns may persist even in issue class actions.233 Mass tort class
actions often require resolution of a matrix of factual and legal issues even among
the "common" issues.234 At some level of generality, of course, mass torts present
common issues regarding the defective nature of a product or the unreasonableness
of a defendant's conduct.2 35 But "as a practical matter, the resolution of ... [such a]
common issue breaks down into an unmanageable variety of individual legal and
factual issues." 236 With respect to factual variations, many product defect class
actions actually encompass a wide range of different products, undermining any
attempt to conduct a manageable "common" issue trial. I n rejecting a nationwide
needle stick class action, one district court recently explained:
[T]his Court finds that the issues of design defect and negligent design
are not common to the class due to the numerous products included in
the class. Each product must be individually reviewed to balance its
risks, utilities, benefits, and
feasible safer alternatives. That is not a
2 38
common class-wide issue.

231. See, e.g., Woolley, supra note 92, at 501 (explaining that "efforts to certify classes
to resolve mass tort claims in their entirety" have often failed because the individual issues
in such cases make the class action unmanageable); In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th
Cir. 1996) (reversing on mandamus nationwide product liability class action in part because
the lower court failed to consider manageability of factual and legal variations among class
members' claims).
232. See Davis, supra note 3, at 231 (urging that issue class actions are more
manageable than "class actions certified as a whole" because there is no need to create
"damages or causation sub-classes ... to accommodate the remainder of the issues to be
resolved before liability ultimately attaches"); Woolley, supra note 92, at 501.
233. See, e.g., In re Paxil Litig., 212 F.R.D. 539, 546 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting
proposed issue class action due to unmanageable nature of common issues that would be
"too vast and too complicated for even the most diligent jury to grasp... [resulting] in trial
management problems and jury confusion"); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307,

1332 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
234. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) ("It
is no doubt true that at some level of generality the law of negligence is one, not only
nationwide but worldwide.").
236. Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 1996).
237. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that some of the sixty-seven tires at issue "come in multiple diameters, widths,
and tread designs; their safety features and failure modes differ accordingly. .... [Therefore]
it would not be possible to make a once-and-for-all decision about whether all 60 million
tires were defective, even if the law were uniform."); In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069,
1085 (6th Cir. 1996) ("A single litigation addressing every complication in every model of
prosthesis, including changes in design, manufacturing, and representations over the course
of twenty-two years . . . would present a nearly insurmountable burden on the district
court."); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
238. Benner v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 214 F.R.D. 157, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see
also In re Masonite Corp. Hardboard Siding Prods. Liab. Litig., 170 F.R.D. 417, 424
(alteration added) (E.D. La. 1997) (noting that because "there is no single Masonite
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Multi-state mass tort claims also require the application of multiple state
laws,239 which severely compounds the task of managing varying factual auestions
raised by the "common" issues of defendant culpability or product defect. 240 These
disparate factual and legal questions undermine the efficiency and fairness of an
issue class action just as seriously as they do in whole case (b)(3) class actions. 24 1
When the state law and factual variations inherent in many "common" issues are
taken into account, therefore, even an issue class action limited to common issues
may fail the (b)(3) manageability requirement. 242 In addition, the risk of improper
severance of certain common issues from individual issues persists in mass tort
issue class actions. 243 As one court recently explained, "[e]ven if it were possible
for the court to fashion an issue class action with very narrowly drawn issues so as
to avoid the Seventh Amendment [Reexamination Clause]
concerns, in doing so,
' 244
the court would likely negate any widespread benefit.
Adequacy concerns may also persist in any issue class action proposed to
improve the viability of mass tort class certification. Stock manageability devices,
such as subclassing to ensure adequate representation to reflect significant factual
or legal differences 245 or special jury verdict forms 246 to help clarify necessary jury

manufacturing process or Masonite product ....
even questions of product character and
manufacturer conduct appear inappropriate for class-wide resolution").
239. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1300 (asserting that even if
state negligence laws vary "only in nuance," the significance of that nuance and need to
faithfully apply each state's law "is suggested by a comparison of differing state pattern
instructions on negligence and differing judicial formulations of the meaning of negligence
and the subordinate concepts"); In re Rezulin Prods.Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. at 70 ("Critical
liability questions therefore presumptively will be governed by the law of the states in which
particular members of this million person putative class reside."). But see Larry Kramer,
Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547, 583 (1996) ("[T]here will

never be fifty different substantive rules, or even fifteen or ten. States tend to copy their laws
from each other, and many use identical or virtually identical rules.").
240. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997); see also
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[B]ecause we must
apply an individualized choice of law analysis to each plaintiff's claims, the proliferation of
disparate factual and legal issues is compounded exponentially.").
241. See, e.g., Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 656 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (an issue
class action approach, "whereby subclasses of plaintiffs are created and only certain
elements of some causes of action are heard, seems inherently complicated and incredibly
inefficient").

242. See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., 209
F.R.D. 323, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (issue class action certification "'is not appropriate if,
despite the presence of a common issue, certification would not make the case more
manageable"') (quoting Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1331-32 (E.D.N.Y.
1996)); Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648, 670-71 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Emig v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 395 (D. Kan. 1998).
243. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
244. Rink, 203 F.R.D. at 672; see also "MTBE" Litig., 209 F.R.D. at 351 ("While a
court may instruct a jury to try only certain issues, it is constitutionally limited by concerns
over juror confusion and uncertainty."); Emig, 184 F.R.D. at 395 (rejecting issue class action
on ground that "the common issues are inextricably entangled with the individual issues").
245. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 669 (2d ed. 1994)
(suggesting nationwide mass tort class actions could be divided into fifty subclasses); Arthur
R. Miller & Price Ainsworth, Resolving the Asbestos Personal-Injury Litigation Crisis, 10
REV. LrrIG. 419, 433-34 (1991).
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findings, have often proven unavailing in mass tort class actions.247 A large number
of subclasses at some point becomes inherently unworkable, 248 and jury forms
designed to truly capture the complex matrix of factual and legal determinations
required to resolve "common" issues can "overwhelm[] jurors with hundreds of
interrogatories and a verdict form as large as an almanac. 249
The set of incentives to fairly represent absent plaintiffs on each varying
factual and legal issue is also implicated. Can a named plaintiff from Montana, who
used a particular product over a thirty-year period, adequately represent an absent
plaintiff from Vermont who used a different model of that product for five years?
Moreover, asking the issue class jury to enter a verdict applying Vermont law to a
particular set of facts, if no Vermont plaintiff is involved in the class trial, may
verge perilously close to an advisory opinion. This point is underscored by the fact
that the class jury may be making findings of fact and law that no absent plaintiff
will ever utilize in individual follow-up litigation. 250 This concern is closely related
to the collateral estoppel requirement of an identical issue essential to the
judgment. 251 Just as courts have struggled to apply collateral estoppel in mass tort
cases where the factual and legal issues vary from case to case, issue class action
resolution of legal or factual issues not necessary to the claims of the named
plaintiffs also may fail to assure careful and thoughtful adjudication of those
issues. 252 In such an event, the jury is really being asked to be a finder of facts
disassociated from any person's actual claim, and that undertaking would be

246. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 815 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995) (criticizing lower court for failing

to consider "whether the case in terms of claims and defenses might fall into three or four
patterns so that, with the use of special verdict forms, the case might have been
manageable").
247. See, e.g., In re Stucco Litig., 175 F.R.D. 210, 216 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that
subclasses and jury interrogatories cannot overcome insuperable manageability problems
raised by class claims). But see Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 77
(E.D.N.Y. 2000).
248. See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 294 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (rejecting subclassing as a feasible solution to factual and legal variations); In re
Masonite Corp. Hardboard Siding Prods. Liab. Litig., 170 F.R.D. 417, 426 (E.D. La. 1997)
(holding the same); cf.Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 380 (arguing that "a spiral of subclasses
and sets of counsel . . . would not only swamp the incentive to invest in bringing a class
action, but would impose tremendous transactional costs on an already vulnerable procedure
that turned heavily on its ability to realize economies of scale").
249. Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 350 (D.N.J.
1997) (rejecting nationwide class action because plaintiffs failed to explain "how their
multiple causes of action could [manageably] be presented to the jury for resolution in a way
that fairly represents the law of the fifty states").
250. Cf.In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing
C.I.R. v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1948)) ("If there are relevant differences in state
law, findings in one suit will not be given collateral estoppel effect in others-and that is as
it should be.").
251. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
252. But see Romberg, supra note 98, at 308 (describing the advantages of issue class
actions over offensive use of collateral estoppel in individual cases because courts certifying
such class actions do so "with the capacity and intent to craft an efficient and fair process for
resolving all class members' claims" with the preclusive implications squarely in mind).
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fraught with the same dangers
associated with issues not essential to the judgment
253
in collateral estoppel law.
Moreover, to the extent individual litigation is not a feasible alternative, as in
the case of negative value claims, the issue class action may prove to be a largely
futile exercise. Because issue class actions exclude individual issues such as
damages, 254 they assume members of the class will litigate those issues in an
economically viable individual lawsuit following a favorable judgment in the class
action. 255 If no such follow-up lawsuits are feasible, however, it is not clear what
benefit the issue class action can offer either the plaintiffs or the judicial system.
The cost and burden of the class action would, at best, establish certain liability
issues on a class basis, but if the class action cannot encompass claims for damages
and if follow-up lawsuits would cost more to litigate than the expected recovery,
the issue class action in such cases may provide only illusory benefits.256
One advocate of the issue class action argues that the exclusion of claims for
damages in issue class actions serves to protect class members from one of the
most pernicious features of recent mass tort class actions: the risk that class counsel
may collude with the defendant to settle the class action on self-serving terms
unfavorable to class members.257 Because issue class actions do not encompass
class damages' claims, it is argued that "[t]he opportunity and incentive for a
settlement in which the defendant and class counsel short-change absent class
members will therefore be much weaker, because class counsel will not have the
power to settle damages, and the defendant will not be able to assure global peace
by settling. 258
Excluding damages from any issue class settlement, however, while potentially
advantageous in terms of reducing intra-class and class counsel conflicts of interest,
may also weaken defendants' incentives to settle at all. Without assurances of
global peace, defendants have far less incentive to enter into any settlement. Even
the promise of removing the threat of punitive damages 259 or guaranteeing an
arbitral adjudication of claims 260 may not be sufficient inducement in light of

253. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
254. See Coffee, supra note 18, at 1440 ("Neither damages nor damage ranges would
be established by the original verdict or by any settlement" in an issue class action.).
255. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
256. But see Romberg, supra note 98, at 302 (advocating issue class actions in negative
value cases).
257. Id. at 326-32. Professor Coffee has aptly described this phenomenon: "[W]here the
plaintiffs' attorney was once seen as a public-regarding private attorney general, increasingly
the more standard depiction is as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable of opportunistic
actions and often willing to subordinate the interests of class members to the attorney's own
economic self-interest." Coffee, supra note 61, at 371; see also Nagareda, supra note 30, at
308-10; Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Prods.,
Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045 (1995).
258. Romberg, supra note 98, at 328; see also Coffee, supra note 18, at 1440 (pointing
out that in issue class actions, "although there could be a 'settlement class' action, it could
only establish liability, not the range within which recoveries would be allowed," thereby
protecting absent class members from the risk of unfair settlement recoveries).
259. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 1441 (suggesting as a viable issue class
settlement option defendant's concession of liability in exchange for plaintiffs' agreement to
abandon claims for punitive damages); Romberg, supra note 98, at 328 (suggesting the
same).

260. See, e.g., Romberg, supra note 98, at 329; Coffee, supra note 18, at 1441.
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plaintiffs' right to opt out of the issue class. Plaintiffs with the strongest claims are
the ones most likely to opt out of any class action and proceed individually, 26' so a
defendant in an issue class action could still be confronted with claims for punitive
damages by opt-out plaintiffs and possibly high compensatory damages awards
even after settlement of an issue class action. 62
Finally, the exclusion of class claims for damages presents yet another
practical problem in the context of class counsel compensation. In a whole case
class action, attorney fees are allocated on the basis of the damages recovered by
the class at trial or in the course of a settlement. 263 But there will be no class
monetary recovery in an issue class action because individual issues including
damages have been expressly excluded from the class action. 264 One option would
be to include in the class notice a provision that informs absent plaintiffs that if the
class prevails, class counsel will be owed a percentage of every plaintiffs recovery
that represents the fair value of the issue to the class. 265 Class plaintiffs in a recent
needle stick liability issue class action offered just such a solution to the attorney
compensation problem: "[P]laintiffs' counsel may make an application to this
Court 'in recognition of the benefits created by obtaining the Class-wide judgment
on the Defect Issue, to establish a lien in favor of plaintiffs' counsel with respect to
266
a portion of any recovery ultimately obtained in such Individual Actions."'
Absent some provision of payment for class counsel, of course, attorneys would
have no incentive to invest litigation resources in an issue class action due to the
high transaction costs inherent in the litigation of any class action.267 But these fee
arrangements may be problematic additions to the abstract nature of class action
notice already necessitated by the issue class action, and require close scrutiny of
the assumption of consent to representation by class counsel.268
CONCLUSION

The issue class action presents a tempting solution to the seemingly intractable
shortcomings of mass tort class actions. Its beauty lies in its stunning simplicity:
when class claims fail (b)(3)'s predominance or superiority requirements because
of pervasive and disparate individual issues, courts may nevertheless certify a class
action that eliminates those individual issues, stripping class claims down to
whatever common issues exist. This approach seems to promise all the efficiencies

261. See Perino, supra note 214, at 154 ("In mass tort cases, core theoretic concepts of
individual rationality suggest that opting out is only an option for claimants who expect to
increase significantly their recoveries outside the class."); Weber, supra note 108, at 1196.
262. See, e.g., Laura J. Hines, Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages in Class
Actions, 36 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 889 (2001).
263. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970).
264. See Romberg, supra note 98, at 332 ("When a partial class action is resolved,
however, there is no common fund from which class counsel can be reimbursed . . .
[because] resolution of the common issues will not include any award of damages to the
class." (emphasis in original)).
265. Id. at 333.
266. Benner v. Becton Dickson & Co., 214 F.R.D. 157, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
267. See Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 380.
268. See Romberg, supra note 98, at 333 (acknowledging the "innovative" nature of
such an attorney compensation scheme); see also supra notes 222-26.
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of a (b)(3) class action without the need to come to grips with any of the
problematic individual aspects of class claims.
Such an issue class action, however, threatens to unacceptably infringe upon
the important individual autonomy interests protected by the provisions of (b)(3).
Predominance is not a technical impediment to class actions that may be
disregarded if it proves inconvenient. Rather, it serves a vital role in ensuring the
class cohesiveness necessary to any inference of consent in representational
litigation. Likewise, the superiority inquiry of (b)(3) validates the assumption that
class members would assent to class representation. Issue class actions also
exacerbate the meaningful exercise of opt-out rights, further complicating the
inference of class consent. Moreover, many of the manageability problems that
have thwarted mass tort class actions remain serious concerns in the issue class
action, and its uniquely limited scope raises other practical problems. If a proposed
class action fails to satisfy the requirements of (b)(3), courts cannot wish away
complex individual issues or critical differences among class members by
certifying an issue class action. As appealing as it might sound, the issue class
action cannot escape the legitimacy and manageability concerns inherent in mass
tort class actions.

